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Abstract
In many matching markets, bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what terms.
We experimentally investigate allocative efficiency and how subjects’ payoffs depend on their
matching opportunities in such markets. We consider three simple markets. There are no information
asymmetries, subjects are patient, and a perfectly equitable outcome is both feasible and efficient.
Efficient perfect equilibria of the corresponding bargaining game exist, but are increasingly
complicated to sustain across the three markets. Consistent with the predictions of simple (Markov
perfect) equilibria, we find considerable mismatch in two of the markets. Mismatch is reduced
but remains substantial when we change the nature of bargaining by moving from a structured
experimental protocol to permitting free-form negotiations, and when we allow players to renege
on their agreements. Our results suggest that mismatch is driven by players correctly anticipating
that they might lose their strong bargaining positions, and by players in weak bargaining positions
demanding equitable payoffs. (JEL: C78, C92, D40)
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1. Introduction
A fundamental question in economics is whether the “right” people end up in the
“right” jobs. Labor markets are important and their allocative efficiency is crucial for
the productivity of the economy. The typical way that frictions have been modeled is
through costly search and imperfect information.1 However, in many high-skill labor
markets, these frictions are limited. Workers typically know which firms are looking
to hire, and similarly firms know which workers would be appropriate for a given
vacancy. Does this mean that the right workers will end up in the right firms? More
specifically, absent these frictions, can decentralized bargaining be expected to result
in an efficient allocation of workers to firms?
On the one hand, if the aforementioned frictions are absent, then in line with a
Coasian logic it might be hoped that two parties leave no gains from trade on the table
when bargaining. If so, and this holds across all possible worker–firm pairs that could
match, then by results from Shapley and Shubik (1972), the matching market will clear
efficiently.
On the other hand, agreements in decentralized matching markets are typically
reached sequentially, causing the composition of the market to change over time. As
this market context evolves so can the bargaining positions of those remaining in it.
Suppose it is efficient for a worker, Ann, to match to a firm, B, but that Ann is currently
in a strong negotiating position; there is another firm, C, with a vacancy Ann could
instead fill. Although Ann would be less productive with firm C, Ann would still like
to use this alternative possible match to bid up her wage with firm B. However, this
alternative vacancy at C might be filled by someone else, in which case Ann would
lose her strong bargaining position. Indeed, if there is no chance Ann will match
inefficiently with firm C, then firm B might as well wait for C’s vacancy to be filled
and for Ann’s bargaining position to deteriorate. Can agents who find themselves in
temporarily strong bargaining positions benefit from these positions without sometimes
matching inefficiently?
No empirical work we are aware of investigates whether bargaining frictions,
that is, the strategic actions of market participants to improve their terms of trade,
can lead to allocative inefficiency. Fundamental identification problems inhibit such
an investigation. Even under very strong assumptions it is hard to identify whether
matches are positively or negatively assortative from wage data (Eeckhout and Kircher
2011).2 More generally, to observe the extent of mismatch, an econometrician must
estimate the counterfactual productivities of matching different people to different
jobs. But unobservable worker characteristics that are valued differently by different
firms can generate any counterfactual productivities and rationalize any given match as
efficient. Even if it is possible to detect inefficient matches, it would be hard to separate
1. See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for surveys of the search
literature. Informational frictions are studied in Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004), among others.
2. Specifically, assuming that workers are vertically differentiated, firms are vertically differentiated,
and surpluses are either supermodular or submodular. Under these assumptions, the welfare loss from
inefficient matching can be identified.
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the role of bargaining frictions and other frictions. To overcome these problems, and
provide some first empirical evidence on bargaining frictions, as opposed to search or
informational frictions, we take an experimental approach.
We use laboratory experiments to study how payoffs are affected by the structure of
the market and whether allocative efficiency, matching the “right” worker to the “right”
job, is achieved by decentralized bargaining. Matching is one-to-one, and we consider
the simplest markets in which a player can lose a matching possibility as others reach
an agreement and exit. Our experiments feature two characteristics, which are common
in many labor markets: heterogeneous match surpluses and endogenous agreements
regarding how the surplus generated by a match is split.3 In the laboratory, we control
the entire set of possible match surpluses, removing unobserved heterogeneity in match
quality and observing counterfactual match productivities. We also track individuals’
bargaining patterns in full.
In our main experiment, Experiment I, we use a standard bargaining protocol from
the theoretical literature to study three simple markets. In all three markets, there are
two players on each side of the market, and on each side of the market, one player is
in a strong bargaining position, whereas the other is in a weak bargaining position—
the weak worker is only a good fit for the strong firm and the weak firm can only
productively employ the strong worker, whereas the strong worker and strong firm can
also productively match with each other, causing the weak buyer and weak seller to be
left unmatched. It is always efficient for the strong worker to match to the weak firm
and the weak worker to match to the strong firm. The three markets vary only by the
value of the surplus the strong worker and strong firm can obtain by matching with
each other.
These markets are designed so that increasingly complex strategies in the
corresponding noncooperative game are required to reach an efficient outcome. As
more complicated strategies are required, we find increasing rates of mismatch. The
rates of inefficient matching are substantial, increasing from 0% to 49% to 70% across
the three treatments. Players in strong bargaining positions, with alternative possible
matches, are able to exploit these bargaining positions and receive higher payoffs as
the value of their alternative (inefficient) match increases. We also find that the market
composition at the time agreements are reached matters. Once strong participants’
alternative possible matches have been lost, they receive a lower payoff.
The Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) organize our data very well across a number
of dimensions, including comparisons across the three markets of efficiency and the
payoffs of players in strong and weak bargaining positions. The essential logic of the
MPE predictions is that players in strong bargaining positions match inefficiently
because they correctly anticipate the possibility that they might lose their strong
3. Many labor markets are characterized by heterogeneous surpluses so that it matters which worker
is employed by which firm. We expect, however, that getting the “right” worker to be employed by the
“right” firm is likely to matter more in high-skill labor markets. These markets are also characterized by
wages being negotiated (Hall and Krueger 2012) and are economically important: The top 10% of earners
accounted for 45% of overall income and for 68% of federal income tax receipts in the United States in
2011 (http://www.heritage.org).
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bargaining position. The main discrepancy between the data and MPE predictions is
that there is more mismatch than predicted. An explanation for this, which is consistent
with our analysis of players’ strategies, is that players sometimes demand at least
equitable payoffs. For players in strong positions, this constraint is nonbinding, but
for weak players it means that, in comparison to the MPE, they ask for too much
when making offers and reject offers they should accept. Whereas in the ultimatum
game players playing in this way induce others to make more equitable offers, in
our market setting, our results suggest that it leads players in strong positions to
inefficiently match with each other, thereby excluding weak players and leading to
both less equitable outcome and more mismatch than predicted by the MPE.
An important question concerning our findings, especially when considering their
external validity, is: What features of our environment drive the inefficiency we find?
Two features, in particular, merit a closer examination. The first is our bargaining
protocol, which constrains the interactions among our participants. This creates
artificial frictions that could be responsible for the inefficiencies we document—in
practice, interactions in markets are much less constrained than in our experimental
protocol, or in fact any protocol corresponding to a dynamic bargaining model from
the theoretical literature. Second, our experiment endows players with commitment
power—after an agreement is reached, players are unable to renege on it. As whenever
an inefficient outcome is obtained, there exist at least two players both of which
could do better by instead matching with each other; this commitment power seems
likely to be important. However, unlike the constraints on interactions imposed by
the bargaining protocol, this is a feature that seems to be present in many matching
markets. Firms, and to a large degree also workers, rarely renege on agreements they
have reached.
In Experiments II and III, we investigate these two explanations. In Experiment II,
we let participants interact in an unstructured way, allowing them to make and remove
offers to anyone at any time. The market composition at the time agreements are
reached continues to affect the terms of trade, and although the rate of mismatch is
reduced, substantial inefficiencies remain. In Experiment III, we instead adjust the
bargaining protocol to let participants renege on agreements they have reached at a
small cost. This reduces inefficiencies a bit more than removing the protocol, but again
inefficiencies remain.
We contend that in many real labor markets the bargaining positions of players
change as others reach agreements and exit the market. Our experimental investigation
replicates and studies this feature. Alternative matches affect the average terms of
trade agreed upon. The composition of the market, which workers and which firms
are still searching for a match, thus matters, and players’ bargaining positions are
nonstationary. Evidence across our three experiments collectively suggests that this
nonstationarity is intimately tied to high rates of inefficient matching. Our experiments
provide some first evidence for the role of bargaining frictions, as opposed to search
or informational frictions, in decentralized matching markets.
Finally, before we dive into our investigation, we want to step back and address
concerns regarding the general ability of laboratory experiments to obtain results that
can be generalized to real markets. This is an important question as the ultimate goal of
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our investigation is to obtain qualitative insights that inform us about the world outside
the laboratory.4 Our paper joins the branch of experimental literature termed theory-
based experiments.5 The philosophy behind theory-based experiments is to capture
key aspects of real economic environments in simplified settings, and to observe real
subjects making decisions with monetary consequences. This can enable clean tests
of important workhorse theories, and speak to important economic outcomes, which
can be very hard to test using field data. In general, the impediments to such field
data examinations include the scarcity of data, unobservability of counterfactuals,
endogeneity problems, and other confounding factors that prevent identifying causal
effects. The very complexity and existence of these confounds in naturally occurring
data is precisely why controlled laboratory tests provide a valuable additional source of
data. If the theoretical predictions fail in the simplest and most transparent applications
of the model, then that casts serious doubt on the usefulness of the theory when applied
to more complex settings. Furthermore, the data created from carefully controlled
settings can be used toward the development of better theoretical models.
Related Literature. We focus in this section on the related experimental literature. We
discuss the theoretical literature in the context of our different experimental protocols.
There is a large experimental literature on bargaining.6 The most relevant to our
paper is the study by Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989), which investigates the effect
of exogenous outside options on the bargaining position of players in a two-person
bargaining setup that has features of both the alternating-offer and ultimatum-game
protocols. The authors find that responders receive a payoff equal to their binding
outside option, providing support for the “outside option principle”.
Our paper is also related to the experimental literature on decentralized two-sided
matching markets, which is relatively thin and for the most part focuses on matching
markets with nontransferable utility (NTU). The prominent studies in this space include
Echenique and Yariv (2013) and Pais and Veszteg (2011). Echenique and Yariv (2013)
consider fully decentralized two-sided matching markets with complete information
and find that most markets reach stable outcomes. When more than one stable outcome
exists, the outcomes gravitate towards the median stable match. Pais and Veszteg (2011)
study both complete and incomplete information matching markets and vary search
costs and the degree of commitment to formed matches; this last variation is similar to
us allowing players to renege on their agreements, which we do in our Experiment III.
4. See Kessler and Vesterlund (2015) for a recent discussion regarding the external validity of laboratory
experiments.
5. The tradition of theory-based experiments goes back to the market experiments of Vernon Smith and
Charles Plott, which had a profound effect on our understanding of the functioning of markets and the
performance of economic institutions.
6. See Roth (1987) for an overview of experimental work on coalition bargaining, which was mostly
concerned with testing cooperative game theory concepts, Roth (1995) for a survey of early experiments
exploring noncooperative theories of bargaining, and Palfrey (2016) for a recent survey of multilateral
bargaining games.
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The authors find that in complete information markets, which are the closest to our
setup, the degree of commitment affects both the frequency of efficient final matchings
and the level of market activity as captured by the number of match offers made by
subjects. Contrary to our main finding, the authors document that the treatments with
commitment correspond to the highest proportion of efficient final outcomes.7
The main difference between our paper and those discussed previously is that we
allow bargaining over the terms of trade, studying decentralized matching markets with
transferable utility (TU). This brings to light an additional dimension of the bargaining
process that is missing, by construction, from games with NTU: Bargainers need to
agree not only on who is matched with whom but also on how to split the available
surplus between the pair of potential match partners. The only other experimental
study of decentralized matching markets with TU that we are aware of is the study by
Nalbantian and Schotter (1995). In this paper, the authors analyze several procedures
for matching with players who are privately informed about their payoffs.8 The authors
find that although efficiency levels were relatively high in all treatments, different
mechanisms suffered from different types of problems: Some produced a considerable
number of no-matches, whereas others produce a substantial number of suboptimal
matches.
There is a small experimental literature studying bargaining on networks, which is
surveyed in Choi, Gallo, and Kariv (2016). The study most closely related to ours is
Charness, Corominas-Bosch, and Fre´chette (2007), which examines experimentally the
effects of network structure on market outcomes following the model of Corominas-
Bosch (2004). The bargaining is structured as a sequential alternating public-offer
bargaining game over the shrinking value of homogeneous and indivisible goods.
Offers made by players on one side of the market alternate with offers made by players
on the other side of the market, and all players on a given side of the market make offers
simultaneously. An offer is a price that is announced to all players on the other side of
the market, who then choose which offers to accept. Experimental results qualitatively
support the theoretical predictions and display a high degree of efficiency: Total payoffs
of players constitute over 95% of the maximum attainable surplus, and three-quarters
of all agreements are reached in the first bargaining round.9
Finally, there is an experimental literature in sociology that studies how network
structures confer power. Two foundational papers are Cook and Emerson (1978) and
7. For an experimental study of one-sided matching markets with NTU, see Molis (2010). For studies
with a more rigid bargaining structure, such as the one in which one side of the market makes offers to
the other side but not vice versa, see Haruvy and ¨Unver (2007) and Niederle and Roth (2009). Finally, see
Kagel (2000) and Featherstone and Mayefsky (2015), who study unravelling and the transition between a
decentralized market and a centralized clearinghouse.
8. These matching procedures range from the free-agency system similar to the problem of matching
baseball players to teams to the simultaneous bid mechanism, in which participants on each side of
the market simultaneously submit the maximum amount they are willing to pay to be matched to each
participant on the other side of the market.
9. See also Gale and Kariv (2009) and Choi, Galeotti, and Goyal (2014) for a study of trading in networks
with intermediaries, implemented through a simultaneous bid-ask protocol and posted prices, respectively.
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FIGURE 1. The three markets considered in this study. We refer to players A and D as the strong
players and players B and C as the weak players.
Cook et al. (1983), and there is a nice albeit brief discussion in Jackson (2010). A
typical experimental design in this literature has several features different from us, and
more importantly, the focus is on identifying strong and weak network positions rather
than evaluating the efficiency of markets. As far as we are aware, this literature does
not investigate the interaction between changing market composition and efficiency,
and the typical protocol considered does not lend itself to such an investigation by
preventing players from exiting before negotiations among all possible matches have
taken place.10
2. Environment
2.1. Basic Setup
We set out to test whether the endogenous evolution of thin, heterogeneous matching
markets can result in an inefficient allocation of workers to firms in the case of labor
markets, buyers to sellers in product markets, or men to women in the marriage
market. As we suspect that inefficiencies will be more likely in more complicated
settings, we consider the simplest possible markets capable of exhibiting the effects
we are interested in. For bargaining positions to change as others exit, we need the
market to be able to support at least two matches, requiring at least four players, and
at least three different matches among these four players to be possible.
Figure 1 presents three different market structures (Game 15, Game 25, and Game
30), which will serve as the basis of our investigation. These are four-person markets,
with each player identified by the letter A, B, C, or D. A link between two players
indicates the joint surplus that this pair of players generate by matching with each
other, with the surplus indicated by a number next to the link. These are one-to-one
matching markets, that is, each player can be matched with at most one other player
in the market. The payoffs of unmatched players are normalized to 0. In all three
10. Perhaps the closest papers to ours are Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993) and Skvoretz and Willer
(1993). Both consider a variety of theories, including some from cooperative game theory.
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markets, the vertical links (the link between A and C and the link between B and D)
generate a surplus of 20 units. The markets differ in one feature only: the value of the
diagonal link between A and D. In Game 15, this link is worth 15 units, in Game 25, it
is worth 25 units, and in Game 30, it is worth 30 units. This diagonal link determines
the bargaining position of A and D vis-a´-vis C and B. We will refer to A and D as the
strong players, and to B and C as the weak players. In all three markets, it is efficient
for A and C to match and for B and D to match. Across these three markets, we study
how the average payoffs of players differ and the frequency with which the efficient
match is reached.
2.2. Key Issues and Experimental Approach
There are several fundamental questions we hope to address through our experiments.
Efficiency. First and foremost, when can decentralized bargaining in matching
markets be expected to efficiently match the two sides of the market? What are the
mechanisms that facilitate efficient matches being reached? What causes inefficient
outcomes?
Network Bargaining Power. How do players’ network positions affect their payoffs?
Can players with alternative matching opportunities play these alternatives off against
each other to extract most of the rents? Does the possibility that these alternative
matching opportunities will be lost limit the extent to which agents can exploit strong
network positions?
To explore these questions, we focus mainly on an experimental protocol
that mirrors a standard noncooperative bargaining game (Experiment I). There are
competing theories that offer different predictions about both efficiency and network
bargaining power. A general finding from the noncooperative bargaining literature is
that there is a tension between using simple strategies and using strategies that can
sustain efficient outcomes. An advantage of using this protocol is that the corresponding
noncooperative game is tractable, and we can cleanly test how this trade-off between
complexity and efficiency is resolved. Better understanding this can inform us about
what insights regarding efficiency and network bargaining power from the theoretical
literature are most applicable in different situations.
However, it is also important to understand the limitations of this approach. In
particular, there are two key features of the bargaining environment in Experiment I we
would like to understand better. First, how important is the rigid bargaining protocol?
Does it prevent players from achieving efficient outcomes by limiting the interactions
between them, or aid efficiency by limiting the extent to which players can try to
manipulate each other? Second, in the bargaining protocol of Experiment I, agents leave
the market after reaching an agreement. Thus, players are endowed with commitment
power by the protocol—they commit not to renege on an agreement whenever they
reach one. Does removing this commitment power and allowing players to renege
on agreements increase or reduce efficiency? On the one hand, commitment is often
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useful in a variety of settings for achieving efficient outcomes. On the other hand,
it makes the environment less stationary and more complicated. We conduct two
additional experiments. In Experiment II, we remove the experimental protocol and
allow players to make offers to whom they want and when they want. Hence, we
investigate the role the protocol plays in our Experiment I results. In Experiment III,
we follow a structured protocol similar to Experiment I, but with the exception that
players remain in the market after they have reached an agreement and can renege on
that agreement at a small cost. Hence, we investigate the role of commitment in our
Experiment I results.
3. Experiment I: Theory
To guide our experimental investigation, it is helpful to consider some alternative
theories. These theories yield different predictions of players’ expected payoffs and
matches—and, thus, the level of efficiency in the market. For each theory, we briefly
describe the main idea and implications for the three games depicted in Figure 1. We
refer the reader to Appendices A, B, and C for additional details.
The experimental protocol we consider is standard and extends Rubinstein
bargaining to accommodate many players. The corresponding game has an infinite
horizon with a common discount factor ı 2 (0, 1). In round t, there is a set of
unmatched players who are active. One player is chosen uniformly at random to be
a proposer. If the proposer is already matched, we move to round t C 1; otherwise,
the proposer can choose to propose a match or to do nothing. To propose a match, the
proposer must select an unmatched player and suggest a division of the surplus their
match would generate. If a proposal is made, then the player who receives the proposal
must either accept or reject it. If the proposal is accepted, then a match is formed, and
those two players, having reached an agreement, leave the market. If the proposal is
rejected, then both players remain unmatched and we move to round t C 1. The game
ends when there is no positive surplus between any two unmatched players.
Although there will often be multiple equilibria of this dynamic game, following
the literature, we focus on two criteria on which equilibrium selection can be based—
simplicity and efficiency. Simplicity has led a large literature to study the MPE of
related bargaining problems, including Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1990), Gale (1987), Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000), Sabourian (2004),
Gale and Sabourian (2006), Polanski and Winter (2010), Abreu and Manea (2012b),
and Elliott and Nava (2019). In our context, the MPE are perfect equilibria in which
players choose strategies that depend only on which other players remain active in the
market, rather than on the entire history of play.11 Although this prevents players from
having to keep track of complicated histories of play, it limits the ability of players to
11. The MPE are motivated in Maskin and Tirole (2001), and have been theoretically justified on
complexity grounds as those selected when there is a second-order lexicographic preference for simple
strategies (Sabourian 2004).
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punish and reward each other. When there are no efficient MPE, a natural question that
then arises is whether more complicated strategies could obtain efficient outcomes. A
second type of equilibria we will consider are efficient perfect equilibria (EPE). By
design, the markets we study require increasingly complex strategies for an efficient
perfect equilibrium. In Game 15, there is an efficient MPE. In Game 25, there is no
efficient MPE, but there is an EPE that punishes deviations by reverting to the MPE. In
Game 30, there is no efficient MPE or EPE that relies on Markov reversion, but there
is an EPE that relies on more complicated strategies. Thus, as we move from Game 15
to Game 25 to Game 30, ever more complicated equilibrium strategies are required to
obtain the efficient outcome.
3.1. Quantitative Theoretical Predictions
We begin by describing the limit MPE payoffs and provide some intuition for Games
15, 25, and 30. In all these games, there is a unique MPE. In Game 15, all players
always proposing efficiently is an MPE. When all players do so, it is as if they bargain
bilaterally with their efficient partner and all players receive limit payoffs of 10. Given
that offers of less than 10 will be rejected, it is unprofitable for A or D to deviate
and instead offer to each other. Thus, in Game 15, the efficient match is reached with
probability 1.
In Game 25, it is no longer an equilibrium for only efficient offers to be made.
If A and D never use their link, they will get limit payoffs of 10 as before, but now
they will have a profitable deviation to instead offer to each other when selected as
the proposer. In equilibrium, A and D mix between offering to each other and making
efficient offers. Whenever A and D match with each other, players C and B get a payoff
of 0. This reduces the amount players C and B are willing to accept when they do
receive offers. In Game 25, the efficient match is obtained when C or B propose, but
not always when A or D propose. Given the equilibrium probability with which A and
D offer to each other, the probability the efficient match is reached is 0.72.
As the value of the diagonal link increases to 30, we reach a corner solution in
which A and D can no longer push down the expected payoffs of C and B enough
for them to be indifferent about whom to offer to. Hence, A and D always offer to
each other. Nevertheless, when selected as the proposer players, C and B continue to
make acceptable offers to A and D, respectively, and we get the efficient match with
probability 0.5.12
There are also equilibria in which non-Markovian strategies are played. In all our
games, an efficient perfect equilibrium exists, reflecting results in Abreu and Manea
(2012a).13
12. For example, we can calculate the expected payoff of C as follows: With probability 0.5, A or D
proposes and C gets 0; with probability 0.25, B proposes and reaches an agreement with D, leaving C
to get 10 from bargaining bilaterally with A; and with probability 0.25, C proposes and gets 20 less the
minimum offer A will accept.
13. They show that by cleverly constructing punishments, an EPE always exists in markets where the
gains from trade are either 1 or 0.
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There are two constraints that make constructing an EPE hard. First, a player who
makes an off-path offer cannot be punished if that offer is accepted (as the player
exits). Second, in any EPE a subgame will be reached in which either just A and C are
active or just B and D are active. In these subgames, there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, and in this equilibrium, both players’ limit payoffs are 10. So once these
subgames are entered, there is no scope for rewards or punishments, and all players
receive relatively high payoffs. In the case of Game 25, this holds, but in Game 30, it
does not, and there is no EPE supported by MPE reversion.
In Game 25, there is an EPE supported by the threat of reverting to the MPE.
We label these outcomes EPE with Markov reversion (and sometimes use Markov
reversion for short). Interestingly, the threat of reverting to the MPE can only support
on-path play, which yields a unique vector of expected payoffs in an EPE (see Appendix
B). Constructing an EPE in Game 30 is more complicated. The threat of reverting to
the MPE does not provide sufficient incentives to induce the strong players to offer to
their efficient partners, but more complicated strategies can be used. In Appendix B,
we derive such strategies and show the range of payoffs they can support. We call these
outcomes EPE with rewards and punishments (and sometimes use carrot and stick for
short). These strategies entail both rewards for not accepting offers that deviate from
the prescribed play and punishments for deviating. Finally, we note that in Games 25
and 30 there does not exist an EPE in which the expected limit payoffs of players B
and C sum to less than 10, which means that the average expected payoff of weak
players must be at least 5.14
In addition to the noncooperative theories we outlined previously, a variety of
cooperative solution concepts have been proposed for matching markets, like the ones
we study. Although these theories abstract from the timing of offers and agreements,
they are founded on appealing principles and provide a useful benchmark.15
A basic principle it might be hoped matching markets satisfy is for no buyer–seller
pair to leave any gains from trade on the table when agreements are reached. This
motivates considering the outcomes that are robust to pairwise deviations, such that
there is no buyer and seller who could both do better by reaching some agreement
between themselves. In seminal work that sparked a literature on market games,
Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that ruling out pairwise deviations in matching
environments such as ours is necessary and sufficient for ruling out coalitional
deviations.16
For the markets we consider, pairwise stable outcomes, or equivalently core
outcomes, require that A is matched to C and B is matched to D for sure, whereas
14. The reason is that in any EPE either B or C will be left to bargain bilaterally with their efficient
partner, thus receiving a limit payoff of 10.
15. Experiments II and III are not amenable to a noncooperative analysis. For example, in Experiment II,
the corresponding noncooperative game would be in continuous time with an endogenous ordering and
timing of moves. In such settings, these cooperative solution concepts may be particularly relevant.
16. If the market outcome was not efficient, then the grand coalition would be able to form and implement
the match that maximized total surplus, and then redistribute this surplus in a way that made everyone
better off. Thus, only efficient market outcomes are robust to coalitional deviations, and, hence, by Shapley
and Shubik’s result, only efficient market outcomes are robust to pairwise deviations.
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TABLE 1. Theoretical predictions about final matches.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D)
Cooperative
SPB 100 8.3 11.7 100 5 15 100 3.3 16.7
Core 100 [0, 20][0, 20] 100 [0, 15] [5, 20] 100 [0, 10] [10, 20]
Core Midpoint 100 10 10 100 7.5 12.5 100 5 15
Noncooperative
MPE 100 10 10 72 6.45 11.45 50 4.17 13.33
Markov Reversion 100 10 10 100 8.75 11.25 – – –
Carrot and Stick 100 10 10 100 .779 ; 9
4
9 /.10
5
9 ; 12
2
9 / 100 .6
1
9 ; 9
4
9 /.10
5
9 ; 13
8
9 /
Notes: For the noncooperative theories, we list the limiting expected payoffs of players as ı ! 1. For EPE, we
consider two specifications: In (i) there is MPE reversion following a deviation, whereas in (ii) there are two
off-path punishment states: one to punish A and B whereas rewarding C and D and another to punish C and D
whereas rewarding A and B.
the combined payoffs of the strong players (A and D) must sum to weakly more than
x D 15, 25, and 30 for Game 15, Game 25, and Game 30, respectively. Thus, although
the match is pinned down, payoffs are not, and many different payoff profiles can be
supported. In Appendix C, we derive the range of each player’s payoffs that can be
supported in a pairwise stable outcome.
Various theories have refined the set-valued predictions provided by pairwise
stability into point predictions. One alternative is to look at the midpoint of the
supported payoffs (e.g. Elliott 2015).17 A second alternative proposed by Rochford
(1984), and independently by Kleinberg and Tardos (2008), extends Nash bargaining to
matching markets. These symmetrically pairwise balanced (SPB) outcomes coincide
with several other cooperative solution concepts—specifically the nucleolus, kernel,
and prekernel. We develop these theoretical predictions for the markets we consider in
Appendix C and record them in Table 2.18
Table 2 summarizes the quantitative predictions of the theories discussed previously
in terms of final outcomes: the frequency with which an efficient match is reached and
players’ payoffs by their network position. When a range of payoffs can be supported,
we report this range.
We also examine the specific amounts that players offer and accept. Whereas the
cooperative theories do not make predictions in this regard that are any more nuanced
17. This is the transferable utility (TU) equivalent to median stable matches in an non-transferable utility
(NTU) environment (Schwarz and Yenmez 2011), which has received some experimental support in NTU
matching experiments (Echenique and Yariv 2013).
18. The Shapley value makes unappealing predictions in matching markets, and so we do not consider
it. For example, with one worker and two firms, the Shapley value will typically require the firm that ends
up unmatched to receive a transfer of surplus from the matched pair.
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TABLE 2. Theoretical predictions about offer and acceptance strategies.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
Ask Accept Ask Accept Ask Accept
MPE strong 10 10 13.55 11.45 16.67 13.33
MPE weak 10 10 8.55 6.45 6.67 4.17
Markov Reversion strong 10 10 11.25 11.25 — —
Markov Reversion weak 10 10 8.75 8.75 — —
Carrot and Stick strong 10 10 .1119 ; 14
4
9 / .11
1
9 ; 14
4
9 / .11
1
9 ; 17
7
9 / .11
1
9 ; 17
7
9 /
Carrot and Stick weak 10 10 .559 ; 8
8
9 / .5
5
9 ; 8
8
9 / .2
2
9 ; 8
8
9 / .2
2
9 ; 8
8
9 /
Notes: The amounts players are predicted to ask to keep themselves when making offers and the minimum
amounts they would be willing to accept are reported. When strong players make offers to both other strong
players and weak players in the equilibrium, they ask to keep the same amount for themselves. The amounts
reported are for when all players are still present in the market. When only two players (who can match to each
other) are left in the market, there is a unique perfect equilibrium in which both players ask to keep 10 when
proposing and are willing to accept offers that give them 10 or more. The amounts reported are for the limit as
ı ! 1.
than their payoff predictions, the noncooperative theories do. Table 2 summarizes these
predictions.19
3.2. Qualitative Predictions
In evaluating the usefulness of the theories, we also consider their qualitative
predictions. Even when the quantitative predictions a theory makes are not supported
by the data, it can provide a useful guide to understanding patterns in the data and the
key forces underlying a given situation.
First, we consider how efficiency is predicted to vary across treatments.
The cooperative theories predict efficient outcomes across all games. For the
noncooperative theories we consider, efficiency is tied to the complexity of equilibria
played. Our theoretical predictions show that more complex strategies are required for
efficiency as we move from Game 15 to 25 to 30. Studying the relative rates of efficient
matching across these treatments may speak to the complexity of equilibria subjects
are able to coordinate on in order to reach efficient outcomes.
The MPE predicts that the efficient match should be reached with a higher
probability in Games 25 and 30 if a weak player is selected to propose first. If there
is inefficiency, but this pattern is not observed, it would be suggestive of forces other
than those present in the MPE driving inefficiencies. These qualitative predictions are
summarized in Table 3.20
19. We decided to look at these predictions ex post, after considering the performance of the theories
quantitatively and qualitatively in other dimensions.
20. We took the decision to look at these more nuanced predictions of the MPE ex post, after we found
substantial rates of mismatch.
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TABLE 3. Qualitative predictions.
Cooperative theories Noncooperative theories
Core Markov Carrot
Core SPB midpoint MPE reversion and Stick
Efficiency
(1) Matching is efficient in Game 15 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(2) The rate of efficient matching declines
from Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
No No No Yes No No
(3) Games 25 and 30: Efficient outcomes
are more likely to be reached if a weak
player proposes first
No No No Yes No No
Players’ payoffs
(1) Strong players’ payoffs increase from
Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
– Yes Yes Yes Yes –
(2) Weak players’ payoffs decrease from
Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
– Yes Yes Yes Yes –
(3) Difference in payoffs of strong
players in efficient matches from
exiting first rather than second is
positive and higher in Game 30 than
in Game 25
– No No Yes Yes –
Players’ strategies
(1) Players do not delay – – – Yes Yes Yes
(2) Frequency of efficient proposals by
strong players declines from Game 15
to Game 25 to Game 30
– – – Yes No No
Notes: We consider a theory to predict an outcome if it would be violated by the opposite finding, in which case
we mark the cell “Yes”, and to not predict an outcome if the theory would be violated by the finding, in which
case we mark the cell with a “No”. If the theory would be consistent with such a finding, but would also be
consistent with the opposite finding, we mark the cell with a “–”.
A consistent prediction across the theories is that the players in weak positions
in Game 25 and Game 30 get lower payoffs than the players in strong positions, and
that the payoffs of strong players increase from Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30,
whereas the payoffs of weak players decline from Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30.
If we see that this prediction is not borne out in our experiment, it would suggest
that our theories are missing the mark and other forces, for example, equity concerns,
other-regarding preferences, or other behavioral phenomena, are swamping the basic
incentives captured by the theories.
A further interesting prediction all the noncooperative theories make for Game
25 and Game 30 is that, when an efficient match is reached, the first strong player to
reach an agreement does better than the second strong player to reach an agreement,
whereas the second weak player to reach an agreement does better than the first weak
player to reach an agreement. Moreover, this difference is predicted to be greater in
Game 30 than Game 25. This prediction is important because it tests whether the
environment is nonstationary. If this is borne out in the data, then, as we discuss in
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the Introduction, there is scope for players in temporarily strong bargaining positions
to match inefficiently from the fear that they will lose this strong position. These
qualitative predictions are summarized in Table 3.
Finally, Table 3 also summarizes qualitative predictions regarding strategies. As
the cooperative theories are silent on how outcomes are reached, these predictions are
confined to the noncooperative theories.21
4. Experiment I: Design and Procedures
Experiment I consists of three treatments (Game 15, Game 25, and Game 30)
corresponding to the three markets described in Figure 1. All our experimental sessions
were conducted at two locations: the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL)
at the University of California, Irvine and the Experimental and Behavioral Economics
Laboratory (EBEL) at the University of California, Santa Barbara. At both locations,
subjects were recruited from a database of undergraduate students enrolled in these
universities.22,23 A total of 10 sessions were conducted, with a total of 176 subjects.24
No subject participated in more than one session. The experiments lasted about one
hour and a half. Average earnings, including a $15 showup fee, were $23.5 with a
standard deviation of $5.3.
In each experimental session, subjects played ten repetitions of the same game
with one or more rounds in each repetition and random rematching between games
(i.e. between repetitions). In other words, before the beginning of each game, subjects
were randomly divided into groups of four and assigned one of the four letters (A, B, C,
or D), which determined their network position. This procedure is standard practice in
the experimental literature and is often used in relatively complicated games in which
it is natural to expect learning.
Within each game, we implement the following bargaining protocol. At the
beginning of a game, all players are unmatched. At the beginning of each round,
all unmatched players then choose (a) whom, if anyone, to make an offer to; and (b)
how to split the available surplus. One player is then selected at random to be the
proposer, and her offer is implemented. This timing differs in a strategically irrelevant
way from the game described and allows us to collect more data on proposals. If the
offer of the selected player is rejected, then both players remain unmatched and the
group proceeds to the next round of the game. If the offer is accepted, then the matched
21. We decided to look at predictions regarding strategies ex post, after analyzing the performance of the
theories in the other dimensions.
22. The software for the experiment was developed from the open source Multistage package, available
for download at http://software.ssel.caltech.edu/.
23. In Online Appendix Section G, we report the location at which each session was conducted and
compare the behavior of subjects across the two laboratories. Our data suggest that subjects’ behavior is
similar across these two subject pools.
24. A total of 40 subjects participated in Game 15 treatment, 68 subjects participated in Game 25
treatment, and 68 subjects participated in Game 30 treatment.
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players exit the market permanently. All players in the group observe the move of
the selected player and the move of the responder. There are two ways in which the
game can come to an end. The first one is the situation in which the surplus generated
by any pair of unmatched players who have made proposals in the last round is 0.25
The second one is discounting implemented as a random termination of the game:
There is a 1% chance that each round is the last one in a game and a 99% chance that
the game is not over. When the game ends, unmatched players receive a payoff of 0,
whereas matched players earn payoffs according to their agreements. At the end of the
experiment, the computer randomly selects one of the ten games played, with all ten
games being equally likely to be selected. Subjects’ earnings in the experiment consist
of a showup fee plus their earnings in the randomly selected game.
In Online Appendix Section I, we present the instructions that were distributed
to the subjects and read out loud by the experimenter before the beginning of the
experiment. Before starting the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a quiz,
which tested their understanding of the game rules. Subjects could not move on to the
experiment until they correctly answered all the questions on the quiz.26 Two features
of our interface are worth mentioning. First, at all times the subjects saw the network
structure and the available surpluses on the left-hand side of the screen. Second, on the
right-hand side of the screen, subjects could observe how the matches evolved over the
course of the previous rounds for the current game, by clicking arrow buttons following
the diagram that depicted the network structure. These features were implemented to
ensure that the subjects had complete information about what had transpired in the
previous rounds of a game, in order to eliminate reliance on the subjects’ memory of
the history of play.
5. Experiment I: Results
In this section, we present the results from Experiment I. We are interested in two
fundamental economic questions—do we get efficient matches and how do players’
network positions affect their payoffs? At the same time, we run a horse race between
the theories presented in Section 3.1 in terms of how their predictions fit the data.
Our main interest is in subjects’ behavior after they have had the opportunity to
experience the game. Allowing for the presence of an initial learning phase, our
statistical tests use data from the last five repetitions of a game played in each
experimental session. We think play in these games will better reflect the market
25. In other words, this rule means the game ends if there are no possible matches between any two
players who are both still actively bargaining (by making proposals). This includes the situation in which
the two strong players (players with two links) match with each other and exit the market leaving the two
weak players unmatched as well as the situation in which all four players are matched (each weak player
is matched with a strong player).
26. The list of questions and the screenshots of the game are also presented in Online Appendix
Section I.
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FIGURE 2. Efficiency levels in Experiment I, experienced games. The average efficiency levels and
the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are reported for each game. Robust standard errors are
obtained by clustering observations by session.
situations we seek to capture—in these markets the stakes are higher and many
participants will have some experience. We refer to these games as experienced games.
We refer the reader to Online Appendix Section H for the detailed analysis of initial
repetitions of the game and learning.
When we compare final outcomes between games, we focus on the groups that
finished the game naturally rather than those that were interrupted by the random
termination.27 When we investigate the strategies used by our experimental subjects, we
use all the collected data, including all the submitted proposals rather than just proposals
randomly selected for implementation. Finally, to account for interdependencies of
observations that come from the same session due to subjects being rematched between
repetitions of the game, we cluster standard errors at the session level.
5.1. Efficiency
Figure 2 presents the rate of efficient matching across our treatments. The evolution
of final match efficiency across rounds of play is presented in Online Appendix D.1.
The statistical analysis of efficiency is documented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 reports
the outcomes of a regression analysis in which we regress an indicator for whether the
efficient match is reached (1Eff) on indicators for two out of three treatments (1Game25
and 1Game30), and these interacted with whether the first player in the game selected to
be the proposer is a strong player or not (1Strong First):
1Eff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Game25 C ˇ2  1Game30 C ˇ3  1Game15  1Strong First
C ˇ4  1Game25  1Strong First C ˇ5  1Game30  1Strong First C " :
27. Random termination was very rare: About 6% of games in all treatments of Experiment I ended
because of random termination.
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TABLE 4. Efficiency in Experiment I, experienced games.
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Dependent variable Efficiency Efficiency
Constant (ˇ0) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
Game 25 (ˇ1) 0.49 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03)
Game 30 (ˇ2) 0.70 (0.01) 0.47 (0.04)
Strong first  Game 15 (ˇ3) 0.00 (1.00)
Strong first  Game 25 (ˇ4) 0.37 (0.09)
Strong first  Game 30 (ˇ5) 0.49 (0.04)
No. obs. 197 197
No. clusters 10 10
R-squared 0.2841 0.4238
Notes: Linear regressions with standard errors clustered at the session level are reported. Significant at the 5%
level; significant at the 1% level.
TABLE 5. Hypothesis tests for efficiency in Experiment I, experienced games.
Regression Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis p-value
Test 1 Regression (1) ˇ0 C ˇ1 D ˇ0 C ˇ2 ˇ0 C ˇ1 > ˇ0 C ˇ2 p < 0.0001
Test 2 Regression (2) ˇ4 D ˇ5 ˇ4 > ˇ5 p D 0.1042
Test 3 Regression (1) ˇ0 C ˇ1 D 0.72 ˇ0 C ˇ1 < 0.72 p < 0.0001
Test 4 Regression (1) ˇ0 C ˇ2 D 0.50 ˇ0 C ˇ2 < 0.50 p < 0.0001
Table 5 runs comparative tests of the coefficients from the regressions.
Although all the final matches in Game 15, in the experienced games, are efficient,
the probability that the efficient match is reached drops to 51% in Game 25 and even
further to 30% in Game 30. Regression (1) and Test 1 confirm these changes. The
positive and significant values of ˇ1 and ˇ2 in Regression (1) show that the decline
in efficiency in Game 25 and Game 30 in comparison to Game 15 is significant
(p < 0.0001 in both cases). Test 1 shows that there is also a significant decline in
efficiency from Game 25 to Game 30 (p < 0.0001). With respect to the theoretical
predictions outlined in Section 3.1, this monotonic decrease in efficiency is predicted
by the MPE, but not by any other theory that we consider.
Furthermore, according to the MPE theory, whether or not the market clears
efficiently in Games 25 and 30 depends on the network position of the first mover: If
the first mover is a player with two links (strong player), then the market should end in
an inefficient outcome with positive probability, whereas if it is a player with one link
(weak player), then an efficient outcome will be reached with certainty.28 The negative
and significant values of ˇ4 and ˇ5 in Regression (2) support this prediction: Markets
are less likely to reach efficient outcomes in Games 25 and 30, respectively, when the
28. In contrast, in Game 15 the MPE predicts that the network position of the first mover plays no role
as all outcomes are expected to be efficient.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa012/5823503 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 18 June 2020
Agranov and Elliott Commitment and (In)efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment 19
first player randomly selected to make a move is a strong player. The same is true if
we condition the efficiency of the final match on the network position of the player
who makes the first accepted offer. Details of this analysis are presented in Online
Appendix D.1. Finally, Test 2 evaluates whether the decline in efficiency is larger in
Game 30 compared with Game 25 when the first mover is the strong player, as also
predicted by the MPE (p D 0.1084).
Despite the MPE making qualitative predictions about efficiency that are in
agreement with our data, the quantitative predictions of MPE do not match the data so
well. In Game 15, all the theories we considered predict that the efficient match will
be reached for sure, and this is borne out in the data. Indeed, in every observation of
Game 15 we have, the efficient match is reached. However, in Games 25 and 30, the
MPE predicts that the rate of efficient matching will be 72% and 50%, respectively.
Our observed rates of efficient matching are considerably lower. In Game 25, only 51%
of markets reach an efficient outcome, which is significantly lower than the predicted
72% (p < 0.0001, Test 3). In Game 30, only 30% of markets reach an efficient outcome,
which is also significantly lower than the predicted 50% (p < 0.0001, Test 4).
To summarize, we find strong evidence that matching is inefficient in Games 25
and 30, but not Game 15. This is only consistent with the MPE predictions of the
theories we considered. Moreover, the various qualitative predictions made by the
MPE about inefficient matching are borne out in the data. However, although the MPE
does well qualitatively, there are significant deviations from its quantitative predictions.
Interestingly, these deviations take the data further away from the predictions made by
the other theories rather than towards them—there is even more inefficient matching
than is predicted by the MPE.
5.2. Players’ Payoffs
Figure 3 presents the average payoffs of strong players (players A and D) and the
average payoffs of weak players (players B and C) across our three treatments.
FIGURE 3. Players’ payoffs depending on their network position in Experiment I, experienced
games. The average payoffs and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are reported for each
game. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering observations by session.
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TABLE 6. Players’ payoffs in Experiment I, experienced games.
Regression (3) Regression (4)
Dependent variable Players’ payoffs Players’ payoffs
(all players) (strong players in efficient matches)
Constant (ˇ0) 10.04 (0.03) 9.97 (0.02)
Game 25 (ˇ1) 5.53 (0.23) 0.13 (0.05)
Game 30 (ˇ2) 7.68 (0.10) 0.02 (0.04)
Strong  Game 15 (ˇ3) 0.07 (0.05)
Strong  Game 25 (ˇ4) 7.26 (0.25)
Strong  Game 30 (ˇ5) 11.81 (0.14)
Exit first  Game 15 (ˇ6) 0.01 (0.02)
Exit first  Game 25 (ˇ7) 2.21 (0.14)
Exit first  Game 30 (ˇ8) 4.62 (0.23)
No. obs. 788 218
No. clusters 10 10
R-squared 0.6977 0.8067
Notes: Linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Regression (3) considers
payoffs of all players, whereas Regression (4) focuses on the payoffs of strong players (those with two links,
players A and D) in the markets that reached an efficient outcome. Significant at the 5% level; significant
at the 1% level.
TABLE 7. Hypothesis tests for players’ payoffs in Experiment I, experienced games.
Regression Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis p-value
Test 5 Regression (3) ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 D ˇ 0 C ˇ 2 ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 > ˇ 0 C ˇ 2 p < 0.0001
Test 6 Regression (3) ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 C ˇ 4 D ˇ 0 C ˇ 2 C ˇ 5 ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 C ˇ 4 < ˇ 0 C ˇ 2 C ˇ 5 p < 0.0001
Test 7 Regression (4) ˇ 7 D ˇ 8 ˇ 7 < ˇ 8 p < 0.0001
The statistical analysis of players’ payoffs is documented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6
reports regression analyses in which we regress players’ payoffs on indicators for
different games (treatments); these indicators interacted with whether the player was
strong (1Strong), and also interacted with whether the player exited the market first
(1Exit First):
Payoff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Game25 C ˇ2  1Game30 C ˇ3  1Game15  1Strong
C ˇ4  1Game25  1Strong C ˇ5  1Game30  1Strong C ˇ6  1Game15  1Exit First
C ˇ7  1Game25  1Exit First C ˇ8  1Game30  1Exit First C ":
As the value of ˇ3 in Regression (3) is insignificant, there is no evidence that in
Game 15 strong players receive higher payoffs. However, the significant values of ˇ4
and ˇ5 in Regression (3) show that strong players do receive higher payoffs in Game
25 and Game 30 than weak players. Furthermore, weak players receive statistically
higher payoffs in Game 25 than in Game 30 (Test 5), whereas strong players obtain
significantly lower payoffs in Games 25 than in Game 30 (Test 6).
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(a) Payoffs of strong players in Game 25 (b) Payoffs of strong players in Game 30
FIGURE 4. Distribution of strong player payoffs in efficient matches by the market composition at
the time of exit, experienced games. In both figures, we consider only groups that reached an efficient
match and focus on payoffs of strong players (players A and D).
Linking these observations regarding players’ payoffs back to the theories
described in Section 3.1, we note that the observed trends are consistent with the
predictions of all the theories. This is reassuring as it suggests that the theories we
consider are able to capture key forces operating in our environment.
To further examine players’ payoffs across treatments, we consider whether the
order in which players reach deals affects their payoffs, conditional on the final match
being efficient.29 In any perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game that reaches an
efficient match, the pair of players exiting second receive the same payoff on average.
This makes sense. These players end up in a bilateral bargaining game with a unique
perfect equilibrium, and this equilibrium is symmetric. Thus, for all our noncooperative
theories, the payoffs of strong players are predicted to be higher in Games 25 and 30
when they reach an agreement first, whereas the payoffs of weak players are predicted
to be lower in Games 25 and 30 when they reach an agreement first.
These predictions are supported in the data. Figure 4 presents histograms of the
final payoffs of the strong players by their order of exit and conditional on an efficient
outcome being reached, where gray bars depict payoffs of players that exited the market
first and black bars represent payoffs of players that exited the market second.30 In
Game 25, the average payoff of strong players is 12.3 if they exited first, whereas it is
only 10.1 if they exited second. For weak players, it is 7.7 if they exited first and 9.9 if
they exited second. Similarly, in Game 30, the average payoff of strong players is 14.5
if they exited first, whereas it is 10 if they exited second; the weak players’ average
payoff is 5.5 when exiting first compared to 10 when exiting second. As reported in
29. Note that when an inefficient match is reached, weak players must receive a payoff of 0 and the
average payoff of a strong player must be 12.5 in Game 25 and 15 in Game 30.
30. Only the payoffs of strong players are shown, but the expected payoffs of weak players conditional
on reaching the efficient match are 20 less the payoff of the strong players conditional on reaching the
efficient match.
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TABLE 8. Predicted versus observed outcomes in Experiment I, experienced games.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D)
Theories
MPE all 100 10 10 72 6.45 11.45 50 4.17 13.33
MPE j eff. 10 10 8.95 11.05 8.34 11.67
Markov Reversion 100 10 10 100 8.75 11.25 – – –
Carrot and Stick 100 10 10 100 .7 7
9
; 9 4
9
/ .10 5
9
; 12 2
9
/ 100 .6 1
9
; 9 4
9
/ .10 5
9
; 13 8
9
/
SPB 100 8.3 11.7 100 5 15 100 3.3 16.7
Core Midpoint 100 10 10 100 7.5 12.5 100 5 15
Core 100 [0, 20] [0, 20] 100 [0, 15] [5, 20] 100 [0, 10] [10, 20]
Data
All 100 10 10 51 4.5 11.8 30 2.4 14.2
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.05)
j efficient 10 10 8.8 11.2 7.7 12.3
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Notes: The last four rows report efficiency rates and average payoffs of players by their network position, with
the corresponding robust standard errors in the parentheses where observations are clustered at the session level.
The first two rows under the category of Data report players’ payoffs and robust standard errors in all the final
outcomes, whereas the last two rows under the category of Data focus on the groups that reached an efficient
outcome.
Table 6, the positive and significant coefficients on ˇ7 and ˇ8, but not on ˇ6, show
that in Games 25 and 30, strong players do better when they move first, but there is no
evidence that they do better moving first in Game 15. Furthermore, Test 7, reported in
Table 7, shows that for the strong players, the relative benefit of moving first is larger
in Game 30 than in Game 25 (p < 0.0001).
We now turn to compare the quantitative outcomes observed in our experiments
with the payoff predictions of the theories. These predictions and outcomes are
summarized in Table 8 (along with, for ease of reference, predictions and outcomes
for the rate of efficient matching).
In neither Game 25 nor Game 30 does any theory predict payoffs for both weak and
strong players within a 95% confidence interval of those observed. Moreover, despite
the EPE being able to support a range of payoffs (possibly even a larger range than the
one we constructed if more complicated strategies were used), there does not exist an
EPE that closely matches the observed payoffs in Game 30. As discussed in Section
3.1, in any EPE, the weak players must receive expected payoffs of at least 5, well
outside the 95% confidence interval for the observed average payoffs of 2.4.
The average combined payoffs of players mechanically depend on the frequency
with which an efficient match is reached. Given the high rate of inefficient matching
observed in Game 25 and Game 30 treatments, considerably above the predicted rate
of inefficient matching for any of the theories, it is impossible for any of the theories
to do very well in their quantitative predictions of matching payoff. To strip away
the efficiency dimension, and focus on the division of the surplus between strong
and weak players, we also present the payoffs of players conditional on reaching an
efficient outcome (last row of Table 8). For comparison, we also present the MPE-
predicted payoffs of players who reach efficient outcomes (third row of Table 8). The
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MPE then predicts players’ payoffs within a 95% confidence interval in Game 25, and
comes close to doing so in Game 30. There also then exist EPE strategies and core
outcomes that generate consistent payoffs in both games.
5.3. Players’ Strategies
So far, market outcomes and market dynamics observed in our experiments fit well
with the predictions of the MPE, and considerably better than with any of the other
theories we have considered. In this section, we zoom in on the players’ strategies to
determine whether MPE also provides helpful guidance for organizing the strategies
used by our subjects. Although none of our subjects use strictly Markovian strategies,31
the analysis that follows shows that strategies used by our subjects are consistent with
several qualitative features predicted by MPE.
The strategy of a player specifies a probability distribution over whom to make
an offer to or choose the “Do Nothing” button, details of such offers (amounts kept),
and the minimum amount a player is willing to accept from others after every possible
history of play. The restriction to Markovian strategies only allows players’ strategies
to depend on the state variable, which is the set of unmatched players. This greatly
simplifies the strategy space and, given the structures of the markets we consider, there
are just two different states for us to analyze. First is the state in which all the players
are unmatched and active and the other is the one in which one of the efficient pairs
has exited the market and the market consists of the one remaining strong player and
one remaining weak player.
When only two players remain active in the market, both the weak and the strong
players receive average payoffs of 10 in all three games, as the MPE predicts. Statistical
analysis confirming this result is presented in Online Appendix D.2. Thus, in the
remainder of this section, we focus on characteristics of strategies our experimental
subjects use when all four players are unmatched and active.
We start by looking at the frequency with which players choose the “Do Nothing”
button. As we have documented in the previous section, weak players earn more when
they exit second rather than first. However, this should not incentivize weak players to
delay in equilibrium because doing so increases the probability that they will be left
unmatched. Nevertheless, do experimental subjects that are assigned weak positions
in a network try to reach an agreement second? To answer this question, we look at the
frequency with which players choose the “Do Nothing” button in each game. Pressing
this button can be seen as the manifestation of delay, that is, the choice not to make a
proposal. Our data show that players almost never choose to delay, irrespective of their
network position: There are no delays in Game 15, one instance of a delay in Game
25 (0.64%) by a strong player, and three instances of delays in Game 30 (1.56%), two
of which are by a weak player and one by a strong player. Statistical analysis confirms
31. Indeed, any subject who proposed two different amounts to the player in the same network position
conditional on the same market composition cannot be playing a Markovian strategy.
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(a) Game 15 (b) Game 25 (c) Game 30
FIGURE 5. Frequency of efficient proposals by strong players, experienced games. For each subject,
we compute the frequency of proposing to her efficient partner in the first round of the last five
repetitions conditional on this player being assigned a strong position. Black bars are the observed
frequencies. Light gray bars take the distribution over the number of offers different players make
from the data, and then simulate the frequencies with which these players make efficient offers
assuming that they all play exactly the strategy prescribed by MPE. We run 10,000 simulations
and report the average frequencies as well as the range of frequencies between the 5th and 95th
percentiles.
that there is no significant difference between the frequency of delays between the
strong and weak players in both Game 25 and Game 30 (see Online Appendix D.2).
The absence of delay also provides some support for subjects using simple strategies.
Next, we examine the frequency with which strong players make offers to their
efficient partners rather than to each other when all players are present in the market.
The MPE predicts that this frequency is 100% in Game 15, 42% in Game 25, and 0% in
Game 30. In Figure 5, we present the empirical histogram of strong players’ individual
frequencies of proposing efficiently in each game. Because the MPE predicts that an
agreement will always be reached in the first round, we restrict our attention to first-
round proposals. The observed proposal frequencies, across the three treatments, fit
the MPE theory well. As Figure 5 shows, we observe a significant shift in the strategies
used by the strong players as the value of the diagonal link increases. In particular,
in Game 15 over 80% of subjects always propose only to their efficient partner in
every game in which they are assigned to a strong bargaining position. In contrast,
in Game 30, over 80% of subjects never propose to their efficient partner when in
strong bargaining positions. To confirm this, we regress an indicator for a strong player
making a proposal to their efficient partner (1Strong Proposes Efficient Match) on indicators
for the treatments (games):
1Strong Proposes Efficient Match D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Game25 C ˇ2  1Game30 C ":
The regression analysis, reported in Table 9, confirms that subjects in strong
network positions are more likely to make efficient proposals in Game 15 than in
Game 25 and Game 30.32
Next, we consider the amount that players propose to keep for themselves when
making an offer and compare this to the amounts predicted by the MPE. Table 10
32. We also run a hypothesis test with a null hypothesis of ˇ 1 D ˇ 2 and an alternative hypothesis of
ˇ 1 > ˇ 2 and find evidence to reject the null (p D 0.0002). This provides evidence that subjects in strong
positions are more likely to make efficient proposals in Game 25 than in Game 30.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa012/5823503 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 18 June 2020
Agranov and Elliott Commitment and (In)efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment 25
TABLE 9. Regression analysis of frequency of efficient proposals by strong players in Experiment I,
experienced games.
Regression (5)
Dependent variable Indicator of proposing efficiently by a strong player
(four players are active)
Constant (ˇ0) 0.95 (0.03)
Game 25 (ˇ1) 0.56 (0.04)
Game 30 (ˇ2) 0.85 (0.04)
No. obs. 428
No. clusters 10
R-squared 0.2518
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Significant at the 1% level.
TABLE 10. Predicted and observed ask amounts when all players are unmatched in Experiment I, experienced
games.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
MPE DATA MPE DATA MPE DATA
mean (robust st err) mean (robust st err) mean (robust st err)
[95% CI] [95% CI] [95% CI]
Strong to strong – – 13.55 12.79 (0.10) 16.67 15.27 (0.04)
[12.49, 13.10] [15.12, 15.42]
Strong to weak 10 10.54 (0.13) 13.55 13.27 (0.42) – –
[9.96, 11.12] [11.92, 14.21]
Weak to strong 10 10.62 (0.14) 8.55 9.07 (0.37) 6.67 7.86 (0.17)
[10.02, 11.22] [7.89, 10.26] [7.13, 8.60]
Notes: For the observed ask amounts, we report average ask amounts when the markets are complete (all four
players are active). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses, where observations are clustered by
session. CI–confidence interval. A “–” indicates that the MPE predicts no offers of this kind.
reports these average ask amounts by offer type, distinguishing between offers from
strong players to strong players, weak players to strong players, and strong players
to weak players.33 On average, observed ask amounts are close to those predicted by
MPE. The closest fit we get are for the offers from strong to weak players for which
the MPE predicted offers fall into the 95% confidence intervals of those observed in
our experimental data. In terms of deviations from the MPE, the strong players tend
to ask for less than predicted when making offers to each other, whereas the weak
players ask for more than predicted when making offers to the strong players in Game
30. All else equal, this helps the strong players to reach an agreement with each other
and hinders the weak players from reaching an agreement with the strong players.
The low offers made by weak players to strong players would result in surplus
being more equitably distributed between the strong and weak players if accepted.
33. Figure D.31 in Online Appendix D.3 depicts box plots of average absolute differences between
amounts offered and those predicted by the MPE both in the first and in the second halves of the experiment
in order to document how subjects’ behavior changes as they gain experience with the game.
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Indeed, we frequently observe weak players demanding exactly equitable splits of 10
each in both Game 25 and Game 30. In Game 25, for the experienced games when all
players are active, 50% of weak subjects ask for an even split sometimes. In Game 30,
the corresponding percentage is 68%. Of the 50% in Game 25 who sometimes propose
equal splits, the average frequency with which an equal split is demanded is 60%. In
Game 30, it is 50%.34
A similar picture emerges from the analysis of offers that subjects accept and
those they reject as responders.35 Consistent with MPE predictions, as the value of the
diagonal link increases, strong responders tend to accept higher offers, whereas weak
responders settle for lower shares. However, although the aforementioned qualitative
difference between treatments is in line with the MPE, there are also some notable
deviations. Strong players’ acceptance strategies are roughly in line with the MPE
predictions. In Game 25, they accept 84% of offers above their predicted continuation
value of rejecting, 11.45 (69 out of 82 cases), and reject 86% of offers below 11.45.
In Game 30, they accept 89% of offers above their predicted continuation value
of rejecting, 13.33, and reject 93% of offers below 13.33. At the same time, weak
players’ acceptance strategies are often at odds with the MPE. Theoretically, weak
players should accept payoffs weakly above 6.45 in Game 25. In practice, they
reject 50% of proposals from the strong players that offered them strictly less than
an equal split of 10, but more than 6.45.36 In Game 30, weak players should never
receive an offer, and in line with this there are too few observations of weak players
receiving offers for us to evaluate their acceptance strategies. These deviations again
make it less likely that strong and weak players will reach an agreement with one
another.
5.4. Horse Race Between Theories
Overall we interpret the evidence from Experiment I as providing broad support for
the MPE theory over the other theories, and consider that the MPE organizes the data
well. The data match the MPE theory on many, albeit related, dimensions qualitatively,
but differ from the quantitative predictions.
Table 11 summarizes the qualitative performance of the different theories. The
theories generally do well at describing how the payoffs of the strong and weak players
vary across games, and the noncooperative theories also predict how this depends on
whether they exit first or second. However, these theories perform differently in terms of
their efficiency predictions. Whereas the EPE theories and cooperative theories predict
34. These frequencies are even higher in the first five repetitions of a game: 65% of weak players demand
equal split of surplus at least once in Game 25 and 81% of weak players do so in Game 30. The average
frequency with which an equal split is demanded is 61% in both games among the players who demand an
equal split at least once.
35. Figures D.32 and D.33 in Online Appendix D.3 depict the acceptance/rejection behavior of our
responders in each of the games in the first and the second halves of the experiment, respectively.
36. Of the 10 offers in which we observe weak players being offered less than 6.45, 9 are rejected.
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TABLE 11. Predicted versus observed outcomes in the experienced games.
Cooperative theories Noncooperative theories
Core Markov Carrot
Core SPB midpoint MPE reversion and Stick
Efficiency
(1) Matching is efficient in Game 15 X X X X X X
(2) The rate of efficient matching declines
from Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
   X  
(3) Games 25 and 30: Efficient outcomes
are more likely to be reached if a weak
player proposes first
   X  
Players’ payoffs
(1) Strong players’ payoffs increase from
Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
– X X X X X
(2) Weak players’ payoffs decrease from
Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30
– X X X X X
(3) Difference in payoffs of strong
players in efficient matches from
exiting first rather than second is
positive and higher in Game 30 than
in Game 25
–   X X –
Players’ strategies
(1) Players do not delay – – – X X X
(2) Frequency of efficient proposals by
strong player declines from Game 15
to Game 25 to Game 30
– – – X  
Notes: When a theory is consistent with the data and would be violated by the opposite finding, we mark the cell
with aX. If the theory does not make this prediction, but is consistent with it, we mark the cell with a –, and if
the predictions of the theory are violated by the data, we mark the cell with a .
no inefficiencies, the MPE predicts, as we observe, that there will be no inefficiencies
in Game 15, but that inefficiencies then increase monotonically moving from Game 15
to Game 25, and then to Game 30. Also, in terms of strategies, the MPE does a little
better. All the theories correctly predict that players do not delay by making no offer,
but the MPE is the only theory that predicts that strong players offer to each other with
increasing frequency as we move from Game 15 to Game 25 to Game 30. Indeed, the
MPE theory also does relatively well quantitatively in this dimension.
Our paper thus joins the emerging experimental literature that examines MPE in a
variety of dynamic games (see Battaglini and Palfrey 2012; Battaglini, Nunnari, and
Palfrey 2016; Salz and Vespa 2020; Vespa 2016). Similar to our results, in combination,
these papers show that comparative statics predictions implied by MPE organize
experimental data quite well across a variety of dynamic games. Simplicity seems
to provide useful guidance for equilibrium selection, even when, as in our case, it runs
contrary to efficiency.
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5.5. An Adjustment to the MPE
Whereas we view the MPE as doing a good job of capturing some of the key forces
at play, the systematic deviations from the quantitative predictions suggest that it is
also missing something. To gain a better understanding of what this might be, it is
helpful to consider again the systematic deviations from players’ MPE strategies that
we observe in the data.
We have seen that weak players are frequently unwilling to reach inequitable
agreements they should be willing to reach according to the MPE. This is reflected
both in them offering less to strong players than they should and in them refusing
to accept offers they should. Taking inspiration from the large experimental literature
analyzing two-person bargaining games (see Roth 1995 for a survey), and motivated by
our analysis of players’ strategies, suppose that some players always demand an equal
share of surplus with their efficient partner, whereas others, whom we term rational,
seek to maximize their expected payoffs.
As already noted, because weak players often demand a higher share of surplus
than predicted by the MPE, they often fail to reach agreements when proposing or
receiving an offer. The same does not apply when strong players are making offers
to each other. Indeed, the likelihood of reaching an agreement in the first round is
significantly higher if the first mover is a strong player rather than a weak player.37
This can account for inefficient agreements being reached with a higher frequency
than predicted by the MPE. Furthermore, as weak players get a payoff of zero in
these cases, the payoffs of strong and weak players are also likely to be less equal than
predicted. So, the presence of weak players demanding too much can help explain both
the observed deviations in the rate of efficient matching from the MPE predictions,
and the deviations in the average payoffs of weak and strong players.38
In Online Appendix Section F, we develop this idea in more detail by calculating
the MPE of an extended model that includes some behavioral players. The behavioral
players always demand a payoff of at least 10 when both proposing and accepting.
We find that by adjusting the MPE in this way it can do a considerably better job of
matching the data quantitatively.
Interestingly, and in contrast to the ultimatum game where evidence for the presence
of behavioral players like this has also been documented, the introduction of behavioral
types demanding equality results in more unequal outcomes as well as more inefficient
outcomes being predicted. Strong players respond to the demands of these behavioral
weak players by more frequently excluding them from agreements, yielding more
mismatch and inequality. Rules of thumb that are adopted by some players and do well
37. In particular, in Game 25, only 50% of offers made by weak players who were first movers were
accepted, whereas this fraction is 70% for strong players who were selected to be first movers. Similarly,
in Game 30, only 53% of offers made by weak players who were first movers were accepted, whereas this
fraction is 87% for strong players who were first movers.
38. These patterns cannot be explained by the rates at which strong and weak players are selected to be
the proposer. We find no statistical difference between these rates in any treatment.
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in limiting inequality in the ultimatum game also seem to be adopted in our setting,
but with the consequence of exacerbating inequality.39
5.6. Key Forces and External Validity
There are two key things that we take away from Experiment I. First, even in our simple
setting, markets very frequently fail to reach efficient outcomes. Second, bargaining
positions matter. Strong players, those with two links, do better than weak players, those
with one link, and how much better depends on the value of their alternative match.
Players’ payoffs also depend on the market composition at the time they exit. Strong
players do better if they reach an agreement when both matches are still available to
them.
This raises crucial questions about the possibility of the bargaining frictions we find
in the laboratory also being present in practice. In real-world high-skill markets, with
limited search and informational frictions, will there still be a serious impediment to
the efficient matches being reached in the form of bargaining frictions? If bargaining
frictions do matter in such markets, might they also exacerbate problems in other
markets more prone to search and informational frictions?
Addressing these questions is hard. The laboratory setting is removed from the
real world in several ways. Nevertheless, better understanding what is driving the
inefficiency we find in the laboratory can help to inform us better about the likelihood
of bargaining frictions having a substantial impact in real markets. To this end, we
advance two related explanations about what might be underlying the inefficiencies
we find.
We know that whenever an inefficient match occurs, there are at least two players
who have a deviation to match with each other that can make them both strictly better
off. So, in our experiment, there are pairs of participants who are leaving surplus
on the table. Moreover, there are simple heuristics that exploit profitable deviations
and if followed, will lead the market to converge to a pairwise stable and efficient
outcome (see, for example, Bayati et al. 2015). Two related features of our experimental
design could be causing problems that prevent this logic from being realized. First, the
presence of a rigid protocol governing who can interact with whom and when might be
preventing participants (in weak bargaining positions) who are about to be excluded
from making offers that would exploit a profitable pairwise deviation. For example,
after a weak player’s efficient partner has received an offer to match inefficiently, this
offer must be accepted or rejected before the weak player has the chance to put a
counterproposal on the table. Second, agreements are reached sequentially, and after
a proposal has been accepted, the players in question exit the market, preventing them
from exploiting profitable pairwise deviations that might remain. If, instead, players
39. A closely related finding is that the players in strong positions are typically not willing to accept
the perfectly equitable and efficient outcome, and instead want to exploit their strong positions. This is
consistent with findings in Weg et al. (1990) and Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996).
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could renege on agreements, there would be no impediment to profitable pairwise
deviations being exploited and efficient outcomes might be reached.40
Although our two explanations are closely related to each other, they have different
implications for the conclusions that can be drawn from our experiment. If it is the
experimental protocol that is generating the inefficiencies we find, then the external
validity of our experiment would be quite limited. In the real world, interactions are
not constrained by a protocol. If, instead, it is the sequential order in which agreements
are reached, and the inability of people to renege on deals, external validity is less
compromised. Jobs in labor markets are typically filled sequentially, whereas firms
very rarely renege on agreements and it is unusual for people to do so too.41
To test these explanations and better understand what is driving inefficiencies in
Experiment I, we run two new experiments. In Experiment II, we allow the participants
to interact freely with each other and do not impose an experimental protocol on
interactions. In Experiment III, we allow people to renege on existing agreements, for
a small cost; otherwise, the protocol from the first experiment is maintained.
6. Experiment II: Unstructured Bargaining
6.1. Experimental Design and Procedures
Experiment II consists of one treatment, which uses the market structure of Game 30
(see Figure 1). This treatment was conducted at the University of California, Irvine. A
total of 88 subjects participated in three experimental sessions, which lasted less than
1 hour, including the instruction period and quiz. Subjects earned on average $23.5,
including a $15 showup fee.
Similarly to the Game 30 treatment of Experiment I, in each session of
Experiment II, subjects play ten repetitions of Game 30 with random rematching
between games. Within each game there is no predetermined structure of bargaining.
Instead, subjects can make offers to any other player they might match with, withdraw
offers they have previously proposed, and accept any currently standing offer they
have received. Just like in Experiment I, offers specify the player to whom it is made
40. This explanation is also consistent with the outside option principle from bargaining theory. Consider
the inefficiencies we would expect to find were two players to bargain bilaterally, but with one of them
having a long-lived outside option. In this case, the “outside option principle” predicts that the two players
should reach an agreement with probability 1 such that there is no mismatch, and, if the outside option is
binding, the player with the binding outside option should receive a payoff equal to its value. Experimental
support for precisely this is presented in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989). The reason the outside option
principle does not apply to Experiment I is that it is based on outside options always being available. When
alternative matches can be lost, because others exit the market, they do not act like outside options. If,
instead, players did not exit the market, and could renege on their current deals, then the same alternative
matches would always be available. In this case, the logic of the outside option principle seems more
applicable.
41. See, for example, Avery et al. (2001).
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as well as the surplus split.42 Once an offer is accepted, the match between these two
players is formed and these players exit the market, that is, have no more opportunities
to move in the game. When a match is formed, all currently standing offers are voided,
and bargaining starts afresh. Similarly to Experiment I, there are two ways in which
the game can come to an end in Experiment II. First, the game ends if there are
no new matches that can be formed between any two subjects who are not matched
yet. Second, the game may end because of discounting, implemented as a random
termination of the game: There is a 1% chance that the game ends at the end of
each 30-second interval. When the game ends, unmatched players receive a payoff
of 0, whereas matched players earn payoffs according to their agreements. We refer
the reader to Online Appendix Section J for the complete instructions used in these
sessions as well as the screenshots and the quiz that subjects were asked to complete
before the beginning of the experiment.
6.2. Results
Our approach to the data analysis is the same as in Experiment I. In particular, we
focus on behavior in the experienced games (the last five repetitions of the game in
each session) and perform most of the tests using a regression analysis with standard
errors clustered by session.
Our data show that with unstructured bargaining markets continue to often match
players inefficiently. In Experiment II, Game 30, the market cleared efficiently only
59% of the time. This is better than in Experiment I, Game 30, which had an efficiency
rate of 30%, but considerably less than all the time.
To investigate this further, we run the following regression on our Game 30
data from Experiments I and II, 1Eff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Exp II C ". This confirms that the
efficiency rate in Experiment II, Game 30 is higher than that in Experiment I, Game
30 [p < 0.0067, Regression (6) reported in Table 12].
To compare players’ payoffs by their bargaining positions across Experiments
I and II, we run the regression, 1Payoff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Exp II C ", for strong and then
weak players. Weak players earn significantly and substantially higher amounts in
Experiment II than in Experiment I [see Regression (8) in Table 12]. The difference
between payoffs of strong players in Experiments I and II is significant but negative
and rather small. Weak players appropriate all the additional gains from trade obtained
from the higher rates of efficient matching in Experiment II, and then a little bit more.
Figure 6 shows the histogram of the final payoffs of the strong players in the
Experiment II, Game 30 treatment by their order of exit, and conditional on an efficient
42. Specifically, to make an offer a subject has to click on the ID letter of the subject she wants to receive
the offer, and to type in the amount that she proposes to keep for herself; the remaining portion of the
surplus the match would generate is allocated to the recipient. The offer then immediately appears in the
column OFFERS YOU PROPOSED on the screen of the proposer and in the column OFFERS PROPOSED
BY OTHERS on the screens of all the subjects still in the market. By clicking on a button, the recipient
can accept the offer at any time until it is withdrawn.
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TABLE 12. Efficiency and players’ payoffs in Experiment I versus Experiment II for Game 30,
experienced games.
Regression (6) Regression (7) Regression (8)
Dependent variable Efficiency Players’ payoffs Players’ payoffs
(strong players) (weak players)
Constant 0.30 (0.01) 14.17 (0.05) 2.36 (0.10)
Experiment II 0.29 (0.06) 0.89 (0.26) 5.53 (0.35)
No. obs. 179 357 269
No. clusters 6 6 6
R-squared 0.0779 0.0296 0.3856
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Regression (7) concerns payoffs
of strong players only, whereas Regression (8) focuses on payoffs of weak players only. Significant at the 1%
level.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20
Payoffs of strong players
All players are unmatched One pair exited market
FIGURE 6. Payoffs of strong payers in efficient matches in Game 30 in Experiment II by market
composition at the time of exit, experienced games. We consider only groups that reached an efficient
match.
outcome being reached. The gray bars in this figure depict the payoffs of players that
exited the market first and black bars present the payoffs of players that exited the
market second.
The average payoff of strong players is 13.8 if they exited first, and it is 10.4 if
they exited second, whereas the weak players earn on average 6.2 when exiting first
compared to 9.6 when exiting second. This suggests that strong players continue to
benefit from reaching an agreement first in Experiment II.
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TABLE 13. Players’ payoffs in Game 30 in Experiment II, experienced games.
Regression (9) Regression (10)
Dependent variable Players’ payoffs Players’ payoffs
(all players) (strong players in efficient matches)
Constant (ˇ0) 4.70 (0.57) 10.38 (0.11)
Strong (ˇ1) 8.52 (0.77)
Exit first (ˇ2) 3.38 (0.69)
No. obs. 440 130
No. clusters 3 3
R-squared 0.5510 0.2953
Notes: Linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Regression (9) concerns
payoffs of all players, whereas Regression (10) focuses on the payoffs of strong players (players A and D) in the
markets that reached an efficient outcome. Significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level.
To confirm these observations, we regress players’ payoffs on an indicator for
whether they are strong or not, and whether they exited the market first:
Payoff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Strong C ˇ2  1Exit First C ":
Similarly to the Experiment I, Game 30 treatment, we observe that the strong
players obtain higher payoffs than the weak players [see Regression (9) in Table 13].
Moreover, as in the Experiment I, Game 30 treatment, in the Experiment II, Game
30 treatment, the order of exit also continues to matter. Regression (10) in Table 13
confirms that strong players benefit from exploiting their bargaining position when
they exit the market first rather than second.
To sum up, when our experimental subjects can act as they see fit in an unstructured
manner, substantial inefficiencies persist and our data show strong support for the
market composition continuing to affect the payoffs of the players.
Experiment II Conclusions. There are two main things we take away from
Experiment II. First and foremost, despite allowing for unstructured bargaining, we
continue to find high rates of mismatch, albeit lower than in Experiment I. Second,
bargaining positions continue to matter. Players with two links do better than players
with one link when both links are still available, but not once their alternative match
has left the market.
There is a simple logic we expound in the Introduction that can explain why
it is hard to get efficient matching. Suppose there are two parties who match with
each other in the efficient match, but that one of them is in a stronger bargaining
position than the other. If the efficient match is reached for certain, then the player
in the weaker bargaining position can wait for others in the market to exit until she
is no longer in a weak position. But given this, strong players would strictly prefer
to match inefficiently, and in contradiction to the premise, we would not reach the
efficient match for sure. This logic is reflected in the results from Experiment II,
as well as those from Experiment I. In both experiments, players whose bargaining
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position might deteriorate sometimes match inefficiently. This creates a real prospect
that weak players will find themselves unmatched, and it is likely that this plays a role
in persuading weak players to accept lower payoffs (thus allowing the strong players
to gain from their bargaining positions).
7. Experiment III: Reneging Experiment
We now test the hypothesis that if we limit the nonstationarities in bargaining positions,
efficient outcomes will be obtained. We test this hypothesis by running Experiment III,
in which we allow players to renege on existing agreements for a small cost.
7.1. Design and Procedures
The design and experimental procedures of Experiment III are very similar to those
of the Experiment I. Experiment III consisted of three treatments, Game 15, Game
25, and Game 30, with each treatment corresponding to one of the markets described
in Figure 1.43 Just like Experiment I, Experiment III was conducted in the same two
locations: at the ESSL at the University of California, Irvine and at the EBEL at the
University of California, Santa Barbara. A total of 10 sessions were run, with a total
of 156 subjects, recruited from a database of undergraduate students enrolled in these
universities.44 The experiments lasted about 2 hours. Average earnings, including a
$15 showup fee, were $23.7 with a standard deviation of $4.9.
In each session, subjects played ten repetitions of the same game, with random
rematching between games. The main feature of Experiment III is the possibility
of reneging on agreements formed in previous rounds. Recall that in Experiment I
players have no opportunity of reneging, as those who reach agreements are forced
to exit the market permanently, which means they cannot make any further moves.45
On the contrary, in Experiment III, players who reach agreements do not exit the
market and can unilaterally break agreements they are part of at a small cost c.46 In
all three treatments of Experiment III, we used the same separation cost of c D 10
cents per broken agreement. Thus, a player who has formed a match remains active
and can both propose new matches and accept new offers when proposed to her. If
a currently matched player accepts a new offer, then she pays the separation cost for
dissolving the previous match she was involved in and forms a new match in its place.
43. In this section, we briefly summarize the main features of Experiment III and refer the reader to Online
Appendix Section K, in which we present instructions, the screenshots, and the quiz for this experiment.
44. A total of 40 subjects participated in the Game 15 treatment, 60 subjects in the Game 25 treatment,
and 56 subjects in the Game 30 treatment.
45. Specifically, when a player reaches an agreement with another player, the button responsible for
submitting offers is disabled and the only active button on the screen of a matched player is the “Do
Nothing” button, which she has to press in every round thereafter. We chose such a design in order to keep
all the subjects engaged and focused on a game, irrespective of the order in which they formed matches.
46. In other words, the button responsible for submitting offers is never disabled no matter whether a
player is matched with another player or not.
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TABLE 14. Offers made to and received by unmatched strong players in Experiment III, experienced
games.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
No match Match p-value No match Match p-value No match Match p-value
Offer made 10.57 10.43 0.52 12.98 12.30 0.09 15.54 15.41 0.71
And accepted 9.21 9.70 0.18 9.41 9.32 0.93 10.56 9.38 0.27
Offer received 9.71 9.31 0.30 11.77 11.67 0.79 13.58 13.14 0.46
And accepted 10.00 10.00 1.00 12.30 12.06 0.59 14.56 14.48 0.21
Notes: This table reports the efficient offers made by strong players (i.e. those to their efficient match), the
accepted efficient offers made by strong players, the efficient offers received by strong players, and the accepted
efficient offers received by strong players. It does so for (i) when all players are unmatched (no match); and (ii)
when the other strong player is efficiently matched (match). The offers made by the strong players correspond to
the amount the strong players proposed to keep for themselves. The offers received by strong players correspond
to the payoffs the strong players get if these offers are accepted by them. The p-values are computed based on the
regressions, in which we regress the observed offers on a constant and an indicator for one of the groups, while
clustering standard errors by session.
If a currently matched player makes a new offer, which is accepted by the responder,
then the proposer pays the separation cost for breaking the match she was part of. The
person who was part of an agreement that is broken by their partner in the current
round does not pay the separation cost, but starts the next round unmatched. At the
top of the screen, subjects were reminded of the separation cost and of the number of
times they have paid it in the current game.
All the remaining protocol details of Experiment III mirror those of Experiment I.
In particular, there are two ways in which a game can end. First, there is a 1% chance
that the game ends after each round, determined by a random draw of the computer.
Second, the game ends if there was no positive surplus remaining between any pair of
players who both made proposals in the last round.
7.2. Results
In this section, we report several key comparisons of final outcomes observed in
Experiments I and III. As before, we focus on the experienced games and use
regressions with standard errors clustered at the session level to perform statistical
analysis.
The premise of Experiment III is that the ability of players to renege on their current
deals will make the bargaining environment stationary. To investigate the validity of
this premise, we compare the monetary offers that unmatched strong players receive
and accept, and the offers unmatched strong players make and have accepted, when (i)
all players are unmatched versus (ii) when the other strong player has already formed
a tentative match with their efficient partner.
Table 14 shows that there is little evidence, in any of the three treatments, Game 15,
Game 25, or Game 30, that the offers received or made by unmatched strong players,
conditional on being accepted or not, depend on whether the other strong player was
matched or not. This corroborates our hypothesis that, if reneging is possible, the
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FIGURE 7. Efficiency of the final match in Experiments I and III, experienced games. Average
efficiency per treatment is reported, along with the 95% confidence interval, computed using robust
standard errors, where errors are clustered at the session level.
bargaining positions of players remain relatively stationary, irrespective of whether the
other players in the market are matched or not.
Our main hypothesis is in regard to a comparison of the efficiency levels observed
in Experiment I with those observed in Experiment III. Figure 7 depicts the efficiency
in each treatment in the experienced games, along with the 95% confidence intervals.
As expected, in Game 15 we observe almost full efficiency, regardless of the possibility
of renegotiation. In the remaining two games, the possibility of reneging affects the
final outcomes and significantly increases efficiency: In Game 25, efficiency increases
from 51% to 82%, and in Game 30, it increases from 30% to 73%.
To confirm that these differences are statistically significant, we combine our data
from Experiments I and III and regress an indicator for whether the efficient match is
reached on indicators for the treatments within the experiments (Game 15, Game 25,
Game 30), and these treatment indicators interacted with an indicator for Experiment III
(1Experiment III):
1Eff D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Game25 C ˇ2  1Game30 C ˇ3  1Game15  1Experiment III
C ˇ4  1Game25  1Experiment III C ˇ5  1Game30  1Experiment III C ":
Regression analysis confirms that in Games 25 and 30 efficiency levels achieved in
Experiment III are significantly higher than those achieved in Experiment I: Estimated
coefficients ˇ4 and ˇ5 are positive and significant in Regression (11) presented in
Table 15 (p < 0.01 for the coefficients).47
47. The regression presented in Table 15 also reveals that in Game 15 efficiency is significantly lower
in Experiment III than in Experiment I. Whereas in Experiment I there are no inefficient matches, in
Experiment III there are inefficient matches in about 4% of cases. We do not view this as substantial.
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TABLE 15. Efficiency in Experiments I and III, experienced games.
Regression (11) Regression (12)
Dependent variable Efficiency Efficiency
Games 15, 25, and 30 Games 25 and 30
Experiments I and III Experiment III only
Constant (ˇ0) 1.00 (0.00) 0.73 (0.02)
Game 25 (ˇ1) 0.49 (0.03) 0.09 (0.04)
Game 30 (ˇ2) 0.70 (0.01)
Experiment III  Game 15 (ˇ3) 0.04 (0.02)
Experiment III  Game 25 (ˇ4) 0.32 (0.05)
Experiment III  Game 30 (ˇ5) 0.42 (0.02)
No. obs. 369 127
No. clusters 20 7
R-squared 0.2735 0.0130
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Significant at the 5% level;
significant at the 1% level.
TABLE 16. Payoffs of players by network position in Experiments I and III, experienced games.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
B (C) A (D) B (C) A (D) B (C) A (D)
All final matches
Experiment I 10.0 (0.03) 10.0 (0.03) 4.5 (0.25) 11.8 (0.10) 2.4 (0.11) 14.2 (0.05)
Experiment III 9.8 (0.12) 9.8 (0.09) 6.2 (0.35) 12.3 (0.16) 3.6 (0.05) 14.8 (0.15)
Efficient final matches
Experiment I 10.0 (0.03) 10.0 (0.03) 8.8 (0.10) 11.2 (0.10) 7.7 (0.09) 12.3 (0.09)
Experiment III 10.0 (0.03) 10.0 (0.03) 7.5 (0.18) 12.3 (0.08) 4.9 (0.18) 15.0 (0.14)
Notes: We report average payoffs of players by their network positions, with the corresponding robust standard
errors in the parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level.
Although there is no statistical difference between the efficiency levels observed in
the Game 25 and Game 30 treatments in Experiment III (see Regression (12) reported
in Table 15), these levels are statistically less than 100% and so some inefficiency
remains.48
We report the payoffs of players in Experiment I and Experiment III in Table 16.
To confirm the patterns apparent in Table 16, we regress their payoffs on indicators for
48. Based on the estimated coefficients presented in Regression (12), we reject both H0: ˇ 0 D 1.00 in
favor of H1: ˇ 0 < 1 with p < 0.0001 and H0: ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 D 1.00 in favor of H1: ˇ 0 C ˇ 1 < 1 with p D
0.0024. Moreover, comparing efficiency levels in Game 30 obtained in Experiments II and III, we find that
this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level (p D 0.0895).
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TABLE 17. Players’ payoffs in Experiments I and III, experienced games.
Regression (13) Regression (14) Regression (15) Regression (16)
Dependent variable Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
Strong players Weak players Strong players Weak players
efficiently matched efficiently matched
Constant (ˇ 0) 9.97 (0.03) 10.03 (0.03) 9.96 (0.03) 10.03 (0.03)
Game 25 (ˇ 1) 1.80 (0.09) 5.53 (0.22) 1.24 (0.08) 1.24 (0.09)
Game 30 (ˇ 2) 4.20 (0.05) 7.68 (0.09) 2.30 (0.05) 2.30 (0.08)
Experiment III  Game 15 (ˇ 3) 0.18 (0.08) 0.27 (0.10) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Experiment III  Game 25 (ˇ 4) 0.52 (0.17) 1.71 (0.38) 1.15 (0.12) 1.31 (0.18)
Experiment III  Game 30 (ˇ 5) 0.67 (0.14) 1.26 (0.10) 2.69 (0.14) 2.85 (0.17)
No. obs. 740 740 502 502
No. clusters 20 20 20 20
R-squared 0.5726 0.4243 0.6860 0.6543
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Significant at the 5% level;
significant at the 1% level.
the different games, and these interacted with an indicator for Experiment III:
Payoffs D ˇ0 C ˇ1  1Game25 C ˇ2  1Game30 C ˇ3  1Game15  1Experiment III
C ˇ4  1Game25  1Experiment III C ˇ5  1Game30  1Experiment III C " :
The positive and significant values of ˇ4 and ˇ5 in Regressions (13) and (14)
(p < 0.01) show that in Games 25 and 30 both strong and weak players receive
higher payoffs in Experiment III than in Experiment I. However, the average payoffs
of the players have to be higher because of the higher rate of efficient matching,
so these regressions just tell us that these gains are shared among the strong and
weak players (although the weak players seem to benefit a little more). However,
conditional on an efficient match being reached, strong players’ payoffs increase,
whereas weak players’ payoffs decrease (Regressions (15) and (16)). This makes sense.
The advantageous bargaining positions of strong players are transitory in Experiment I,
but more permanent in Experiment III.
Takeaways from Experiment III. There are two main things we take away from
Experiment III. First, bargaining positions continue to matter, but unlike before there
is no evidence that they change as agreements are reached. Our intention was to make
the environment more stationary, and, reassuringly, the evidence is consistent with
this. Second, and more important, with more stationary bargaining positions efficiency
increases quite considerably, although nontrivial and statistically significant rates of
mismatch remain.
8. Conclusions
Market clearing is a fundamental question in economics. It is important to get the
“right” people into the “right” jobs, especially in the high-skill labor markets in which
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mismatches can be very costly in terms of efficiency. In this paper, we remove standard
frictions and study mismatch. We turn off search frictions by letting players be patient,
remove information problems by giving everyone symmetric information about match
surpluses, remove coordination problems by considering very simple markets, and
give norms a good chance of yielding the efficient outcome by considering markets in
which a perfectly equitable and efficient outcome is feasible. We still find persistent
and extensive mismatches across our three experiments.
Inefficiencies are highest when interactions are constrained by an experimental
protocol and participants are not permitted to renege on agreements they reach. In this
experiment (our main experiment), the MPE of the corresponding bargaining game
does a good job of organizing the data across a variety of dimensions. This includes
market outcomes as well as a more nuanced prediction regarding players’ strategies.
Nevertheless, some participants’ strategies are suggestive of systematic deviations that
exhibit a particular behavioral bias—similarly to previous experimental work on the
ultimatum game, some players in weak positions demand a more equitable split of
surplus than theory suggests they should. However, unlike in the ultimatum game, in
our setting this reduces efficiency and makes outcomes less equal. Instead of being
offered more, behavioral players are left unmatched more often, and market outcomes
are both less efficient and less equitable than predicted by the MPE.
We remove the bargaining protocol in Experiment II, thereby permitting much
richer endogenous interactions, and inefficiency improves but remains substantial.
This suggests that the results from the first experiment are not just driven by the
rigid bargaining protocol. Permitting agents to renege on agreements, which makes
the environment more stationary, efficiency improves more, but again nontrivial
inefficiencies persist. As bargaining positions seem nonstationary in many high-skill
labor markets, we view our results as being consistent with the bargaining frictions
we document contributing towards mismatch in actual markets. Frictions in our
experiment arise because of both the protocol and the commitment. Although we
view the constraints put on interactions by the protocol as an unrealistic representation
of interactions in real markets, there is often a commitment.
Appendix A: Experiment I: Markov Perfect Equilibria
In this section, we derive the MPE predictions summarized in Section 3.1. A more
formal and general derivation is provided in Elliott and Nava (2019). We start with
Game 25. Let W(ı) be the continuation value of players in the subgames where they
are bargaining bilaterally with their efficient partners. By Rubinstein (1982) there is
a unique perfect equilibrium in these subgames and limı!1W(ı) D 10. Letting Vi be
the continuation value of player i when no one has yet been matched, we look for a
symmetric solution in which VA D VD WD VS is the continuation value for both the
strong players and VB D VC WD VW is the continuation value for both the weak players.
We guess and verify that in Game 25 there is an equilibrium in which the strong players
mix between offering to each other and offering to their efficient partners. Letting q
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be the probability that the strong players, A and D, offer inefficiently to each other if
either is selected as the proposer, we then have the following system of equations:
VS D
1
4

20  ıVW C ı.1 C q/VS C .2  q/ıW.ı/

;
VW D
1
4

20  ıVS C .1  q/ıVW C .2  q/ıW.ı/

;
20  ıVW D 25  ıVS:
The first two equations state the continuation values of the strong and weak players
as determined by the possible transitions in states that can occur and the payoffs
associated with these transitions. The last equation is an indifference condition that
must be satisfied for the strong players to strictly mix who they offer to.
Solving this system of equations and taking limits, we get
q ! 16 
p
160
6
D 0:56;
VS ! 11:45;
VW ! 6:45:
Given these continuation values, it is easily verified that no players have a profitable
deviation. As players are always offered their continuation values, acceptance is
optimal, and as the strong players mix, by construction they are indifferent between
offering to each other and offering to their efficient partners. Finally, delaying is
unprofitable. In the limit, by deviating and delaying a weak player receives an expected
payoff of 6.45 < 20  11.45, whereas a strong player receives an expected payoff of
11.45 < 20  6.45 D 25  11.45.
For Game 30, players A and D strictly prefer offering to each other. The system of
equations is then
VS D
1
4

30  ıVS C 2ıVS C ıW.ı/

;
VW D
1
4

20  ıVS C ıW.ı/

:
Solving this system of equations and taking limits, we get
VS !
40
3
D 13:33;
VW !
25
6
D 4:17:
It is again easily verified that this is an equilibrium. For example, were
a strong player to deviate and make an offer to a weak player, the lowest
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acceptable offer they could make would leave the strong player with a payoff of
20  4.17 < 30  13.33.
Appendix B: Experiment I: Efficient Perfect Equilibria
To construct an EPE, we need to create the right system of rewards and punishments
for players to play efficiently. One measure of the complexity of strategies is the
extent to which the players’ prescribed actions vary with the history of play (see, for
example, Kalai and Stanford 1988). In this sense, Markovian strategies are particularly
simple, as they depend only on the history through the state—in this case, the set of
active players. In order to incentivize the players to play efficiently, more complicated
strategies are necessary to create the right system of rewards and punishments.
We start by considering a particularly simple class of EPE where (only) reversion
to the MPE is used as a punishment. Thus, equilibrium play depends only on the state
and whether there has been a deviation. It does not matter who deviated or when. In
Game 25, there is a perfect equilibrium that can be supported by reversion to the MPE.
Let the expected MPE payoff of player i be V Mi .ı/, and as before let W(ı) be the payoff
of a player in the unique perfect equilibrium of the subgame where all other players
except her efficient partner has exited.
We construct an EPE in which, on path, player i offers her efficient partner (i)
a payoff ıV Mi and the offer is accepted. Any deviation from this play is punished by
moving to the MPE. Thus, by construction, player i best responds by accepting the
offer. Indeed, given that deviations are supported by reversion to the MPE, player
i must offer her efficient partner exactly ıV M
.i/
. Anything less would be rejected
by (i). If the strategy prescribed i offering anything more than ıV M
.i/
to (i),
then i would have a profitable deviation to offer a little less, and, knowing that
because i has deviated play will revert to the MPE strategies thereafter, (i) would
accept.
It is easily verified that ıV Mi < 20  ıV M.i/ for all players, and, thus, all players
prefer making the prescribed offers to delaying. The final deviation to check is that
the strong players cannot do better by offering to each other. In Game 25, this requires
that 25  ıV MS  20  ıV MW . As a strong player offering to another strong player
constitutes a deviation, thereafter the MPE will be played. Hence, each strong player
will just be willing to accept an offer from the other strong player that leaves her with a
payoff of ıV MS . In the MPE, the strong players mix between making offers to each other
and offering to their efficient partner, and so are indifferent between these alternatives,
implying that 25  ıV MS D 20  ıV MW . Thus, the aforementioned inequality is satisfied
and the strong players do not have a profitable deviation. However, this is not the case
for Game 30. In Game 30, the strong players do not have a profitable deviation if
30  ıV MS  20  ıV MW (where these MPE continuation values are for Game 30 and
not for Game 25 as before). As in the MPE of Game 30, the strong players strictly
prefer offering to each other than offering efficiently, 30  ıV MS > 20  ıV MW . Thus,
in Game 30, Markov reversion does not provide sufficient incentives for the strong
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players to offer efficiently, and there is no efficient MPE with Markov reversion for
Game 30.
In the efficient PE with MPE reversion for Game 25, the limit payoffs of the players
are
VS D
1
4

20  ıV MW C ıV MS C ı2 W.ı/
 ! 11:25;
VW D
1
4

20  ıV MS C ıV MW C ı2 W.ı/
 ! 8:75:
To further illustrate that there is no such EPE for Game 30, and letting V Mi now
refer to the expected MPE payoff of player i in Game 30 (as opposed to Game 25), the
limit payoffs of the players would be
VS D
1
4

20  ıV MW C ıV MS C ı2 W.ı/
 ! 12:29;
VW D
1
4

20  ıV MS C ıV MW C ı2 W.ı/
 ! 7:71;
But then if selected as the proposer, a strong player can either stick with the
prescribed strategy that offers their (weak) efficient partner a payoff ıV MW , leaving
them with a limit payoff of 15.83, or deviate and offer the other strong player a payoff
ıV MS , which the other strong player would accept, leaving them with a limit payoff of
16.66.
To find a limit MPE for Game 30, we need to consider more complicated strategies
in which players are both rewarded for rejecting off-path offers and punished for
making off-path offers. The rewards are important because we can punish an off-path
offer only if it is rejected. On-path, we look for an equilibrium in which players B
and C make efficient acceptable offers that leave them with a payoff of x and accept
offers of x from their efficient partners. This is shown in panel (c) of Figure B.1.
On-path, after the first efficient pair of players exit the market, the remaining efficient
pair bargain bilaterally with each other. In such subgames, there is a unique perfect
equilibrium (Rubinstein 1982) and the remaining active players receive payoffs W(ı)
that converge to 10. Thus, in any efficient equilibrium, the last weak player to reach an
agreement receives a limit payoff of 10. In order to get these weaker players to accept
and make offers that give them a payoff of x < 10, we need to punish them if they
deviate.
We construct off-path punishments that are credible and create the appropriate
incentives for players to remain on path. This is achieved by defining two different
punishment states, prescribing play in each of these states and a rule for transitioning
between them in a way that creates the appropriate incentives. These transitions
are such that they occur only if someone deviates from their prescribed strategy,
in which case the person who initiated the deviation is punished by moving to the
state that punishes her. Importantly, these transitions also reward all the players with
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FIGURE B.1. Constructing an EPE for Game 30. Panel (b) shows the transitions between states
when players deviate from the prescribed play, whereas panels (c)–(e) show how players play in each
state. Red arrows indicate whom a player offers to if selected as the proposer; and the numbers next
to the arrows indicate the payoffs that the offering players will keep.
whom the punished player is linked. These transitions are illustrated in panel (b) of
Figure B.1.
To show that the punishments are credible, suppose we are in the Punish A, B state.
If everyone plays as prescribed, we remain in this state and the payoffs of the players
are given by the following value functions:
bV A D 14

30  ıbV D C 2ıW.ı/ C ıbV A D 30  ıbV D C 2ıW.ı/4  ı ! 1119;
bV B D 14

20  ıbV D C 313 C ıbV B

D 20  ı
bV D C 313
4  ı ! 2
2
9
;
bV C D 14

ıbV C C 2 W.ı/ D 2 W.ı/4  ı ! 623;
bV D D 14

16
2
3
C 3ıbV D

D 16
2
3
4  3ı ! 16
2
3
:
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By symmetry, the Punish C, D state value functions of the players are
eV A D 16234  3ı ! 1623;
eV B D 2 W.ı/4  ı ! 623;
eV C D 20  ıbV D C 3134  ı ! 229;
eV D D 30  ıbV D C 2 W.ı/4  ı ! 1119:
Consider now the deviations available to the players in the Punish A, B state.
First, suppose that A deviates and offers D less than ıbV D. By rejecting the offer, D
ensures that we remain in the same state and that he will receive, in expectation, ıbV D.
Alternatively, A may delay, in which case A receives ıbV A < 30  ıbV D. Finally, A
could offer to C. C would accept anything greater than ıbV C and reject anything less,
because we would remain in the Punish A, B state. Thus, A must offer C a limit payoff
of 62
3
, leaving A with 131
3
 30  162
3
D 131
3
.
49 The alternative deviations available
to B are to offer D less than ıbV D, which D would reject, leaving B with 213 < 313 ,
or to delay, which would also leave B with 21
3
< 31
3
. The only deviation available to
C is to make an offer to A. As rejecting C’s offer will result in a switch of states, A
would accept only a limit payoff which is weakly greater than 162
3
, leaving C with
31
3
< 62
3
. Finally, D could deviate. As a deviation by D would result in a switch of
states if rejected, for an off-path offer to be accepted D must offer B at least 62
3
in the
limit, or A at least 162
3
in the limit. Both deviations are thus unprofitable. Finally, as
delay would also result in a switch of states, that alternative is unprofitable for D as
well. This covers all the possible deviations from the Punish A, B state. By symmetry,
there are no profitable deviations from the Punish C, D state.
For these punishments to be effective, in the on-path state C and B must be required
to accept only offers, in the limit, of weakly more than 22
9
, or to make offers that leave
them with at least 22
9
. Similarly, A and D must be required to accept only offers of
weakly more than 111
9
in the limit, or to make offers that leave them with at least 111
9
in the limit. Thus, for any x 2 .22
9
; 88
9
/; there exists an EPE. This places bounds on
the offers that can be supported when all the players are active. In the subgame reached
once an efficient pair has exited, the remaining players get limit payoffs of 10. Thus,
the weak players will have limit expected payoffs in the range .61
9
; 94
9
/, whereas the
strong players will have limit expected payoffs in the range .105
9
; 138
9
/.
49. This inequality would become strict, whereas the others remain satisfied, were the offer D makes
to B to be increased slightly. We make this incentive constraint tight to make the punishment as harsh as
possible so that we can find the full range of payoffs that can be supported.
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The construction we use to find an EPE for Game 30 also works for Game 25. In
that case, in the Punish A, B state we would need to make A offer D no more than 112
3
,
leaving A with 131
3
, so that A does not want to deviate and, instead, offer to C. As A
offers D his continuation value, this implies that VD D 1123 , which means that B also
offers 112
3
to D and that D offers 81
3
to B. This gives a limit payoff to B of VB D 559 .
As before, C’s limit payoff is VD D 623 . Finally, A’s limit payoff is 1119 . Given these
strategies and limit payoffs, it can be verified that all the incentive constraints are
satisfied. Thus, there is an EPE for any x 2 .55
9
; 88
9
/. As limit payoffs in the subgame
are again 10, weak players have limit expected payoffs in the range .77
9
; 94
9
/; whereas
strong players have limit payoffs in the range .105
9
; 122
9
/.
Although for Game 15 the MPE is efficient, this construction cannot be used in this
Game to extend the payoffs that can be supported in an EPE. The intuition is that the
strong players can always guarantee themselves 10 by ignoring their link, whereas they
cannot use this link to get more than 10 because the threat of matching inefficiently
and receiving an average payoff of 7.5 is not credible. To see what specifically goes
wrong with the construction, let x be the amount player D asks to keep when making
an offer to B in the Punish A, B state. Note that C’s limit continuation value is still 62
3
and that C is required to delay. If C deviates and does not delay, then C is punished
by moving to the Punish C, D state. In that case, C gets the same limit payoff that
B gets in the Punish A, B state. That limit payoff is 2
3
.20  x/, so we require that
x  10. However, in that case, the limit payoff of A is 1
3
.15  x/ C 2
3
.10/  81
3
. But
this means that A has an incentive to deviate and delay. This deviation does not change
the state (as we are already in the Punish A, B state), but does mean that B and D will
match first for sure, leaving A with a limit payoff of 10.
Appendix C: Cooperative Theories
With unstructured bargaining, efficiency-enhancing norms could emerge to the mutual
benefit of everyone. The participants have much more freedom to reach implicit
agreements that exploit inefficiencies for their mutual gain. This logic is present
in several solution concepts from cooperative game theory, and with unstructured
bargaining, we might expect their predictions to be borne out. To guide our experiment,
we consider two such theories: (i) an extension of Nash bargaining, where the
disagreement points are defined endogenously by the market; and (ii) the midpoint
of the core.50
The first solution concept we consider is Symmetric Pairwise Bargained (SPB)
outcomes, first developed by Rochford (1984) and independently discovered by
Kleinberg and Tardos (2008). This approach extends Nash bargaining to networks. A
50. We do not consider the Shapley value or related concepts. The Shapley value makes predictions that
can be infeasible in our setting when each matched pair of players is required to split between themselves
the surplus they generate. For example, if there is one worker and two firms and all matches generate a
positive surplus, then the Shapley value requires that all players receive strictly positive payoffs.
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TABLE C.1. Theoretical predictions about final matches.
Game 15 Game 25 Game 30
eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D) eff.(%) B (C) A (D)
SPB 100 8.3 11.7 100 5 15 100 3.3 16.7
Core 100 [0, 20] [0, 20] 100 [0, 15] [5, 20] 100 [0, 10] [10, 20]
Core midpoint 100 10 10 100 7.5 12.5 100 5 15
player’s disagreement payoff is the surplus they could obtain by just enticing someone
else to match with them. Given these disagreement payoffs, each of the two players
reaching an agreement gets their disagreement payoff plus an equal share of the
remaining surplus. Of course, the disagreement payoff for a given player depends on
the agreements others reach, and so the solution boils down to finding a fixed point of
a large system of equations. We derive predictions for Games 15, 25, and 30 in Section
E.1 in the Online Appendix. These predictions coincide with the predictions of three
other cooperative solution concepts, kernel, prekernel, and nucleolus.
Our next cooperative theory is an alternative refinement of the core. The core
comprises the set of bargaining outcomes that allocate the surplus generated by
matching such that there is no coalition of players that could find a match among
themselves, and then allocate that surplus in a way that makes them all better off.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that there are no profitable coalitional deviations if
and only if there are no profitable pairwise deviations, which just requires that for all
worker–firm pairs the sum of their payoffs is weakly greater than the surplus they could
generate by matching with each other. This implies that the match implemented must
be efficient. It also follows from results by Shapley and Shubik (1972) that there is a
midpoint of the core in which two players reaching an agreement receive their worst
possible core payoff for sure, and then split the remaining surplus equally.51 In an NTU
environment, Echenique and Yariv (2013) experimentally find that the median stable
match is reached. For the markets we consider, the midpoint of the core corresponds
to the TU median stable matching (Schwarz and Yenmez 2011). These predictions are
derived in Section E.2 in the Online Appendix and reported in Table C.1.
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